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PATENT LAW’S REPRODUCIBILITY 
PARADOX 
JACOB S. SHERKOW† 
ABSTRACT 
  Clinical research faces a reproducibility crisis. Many recent clinical 
and preclinical studies appear to be irreproducible—their results 
cannot be verified by outside researchers. This is problematic for not 
only scientific reasons but also legal ones: patents grounded in 
irreproducible research appear to fail their constitutional bargain of 
property rights in exchange for working disclosures of inventions. The 
culprit is likely patent law’s doctrine of enablement. Although the 
doctrine requires patents to enable others to make and use their claimed 
inventions, current difficulties in applying the doctrine hamper or even 
actively dissuade reproducible data in patents. This Article assesses the 
difficulties in reconciling these basic goals of scientific research and 
patent law. More concretely, it provides several examples of 
irreproducibility in patents on blockbuster drugs—Prempro, Xigris, 
Plavix, and Avastin—and discusses some of the social costs of the 
misalignment between good clinical practice and patent doctrine. 
Ultimately, this analysis illuminates several current debates concerning 
innovation policy. It strongly suggests that a proper conception of 
enablement should take into account after-arising evidence. It also 
sheds light on the true purpose—and limits—of patent disclosure. And 
lastly, it untangles the doctrines of enablement and utility. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Clinical research currently faces a reproducibility crisis. Francis S. 
Collins, the former Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), 
recently voiced the concern “that the complex system for ensuring the 
reproducibility of biomedical research is failing and is in need of 
restructuring.”1 An economics review of preclinical research estimated 
that U.S. researchers spend approximately $28 billion per year on 
irreproducible studies.2 The Economist stated bluntly: “Scientists like 
 
 1. Francis S. Collins & Lawrence A. Tabak, NIH Plans to Enhance Reproducibility, 505 
NATURE 612, 612 (2014). 
 2. Leonard P. Freedman, Iain M. Cockburn & Timothy S. Simcoe, The Economics of 
Reproducibility in Preclinical Research, PLOS BIOLOGY, June 9, 2015, at 3.  
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to think of science as self-correcting. To an alarming degree, it is not.”3 
Although reproducibility—the verification of scientific results by 
outside researchers—lies at the heart of the scientific method,4 “the 
checks and balances that once ensured scientific fidelity have been 
hobbled.”5 And patent law is at least partly to blame. 
Because patents require their inventors to sufficiently disclose 
their inventions to others—enough to enable their peers to “make and 
use” their claimed inventions6—it would seem that patent law provides 
a bulwark against irreproducibility. But it does not. To the contrary, 
the availability of patents for the products of clinical research appears 
to hamper or even actively dissuade reproducibility.7 Since 
 
 3. Trouble at the Lab, ECONOMIST (Oct. 19, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/
briefing/21588057-scientists-think-science-self-correcting-alarming-degree-it-not-trouble [https://
perma.cc/NHT8-WPW8]. 
 4. See H.M. COLLINS, CHANGING ORDER: REPLICATION AND INDUCTION IN SCIENTIFIC 
PRACTICE 19 (1992) (“Replication is the scientifically institutionalized counterpart of the stability 
of perception.”); KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 9 Routledge Classics 
(2002) (1959) (“The purpose of this [verification] is to find out how far the new consequences of 
[a] theory—whatever may be new in what it asserts—stand up to the demands of practice, whether 
raised by purely scientific experiments, or by practical technological applications.”); Dmitry 
Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and Biotechnology’s 
Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 109 (2011) 
(“Reproducibility is the touchstone of the scientific method and one of the strongest norms of the 
research community.”); Sören Sonnenburg et al., The Need for Open Source Software in Machine 
Learning, 8 J. MACH. LEARNING RES. 2443, 2449 (2007) (“In many areas of science it is only when 
an experiment has been corroborated independently by another group of researchers that it is 
generally accepted by the scientific community.”); Victoria Stodden, Reproducing Statistical 
Results, 2 ANN. REV. STAT. APPLICATIONS 1, 2–4 (2015) [hereinafter Stodden, Reproducing 
Statistical Results]. Stodden notes:  
A fundamental goal of statistics is to ensure the reproducibility of scientific 
findings. . . . If discoveries are made, it is of great interest to understand whether these 
findings persist in different samples, which may be drawn from the same or different 
populations, and potentially with different measurement or estimation techniques. The 
persistence of findings across different samples is the basis upon which scientific claims 
are evaluated. 
Id. at 2. To be clear, reproducibility and replicability are related but distinct concepts, and the 
differences between them may be nuanced. See generally Chris Drummond, Replicability Is Not 
Reproducibility: Nor Is It Good Science, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EVALUATION METHODS FOR 
MACHINE LEARNING WORKSHOP AT THE 26TH ICML, MONTREAL, CANADA (2009) (analyzing 
the differences between replicability and reproducibility). To the extent these concepts can be 
separated, this Article focuses on what can be considered classic reproducibility—whether the 
results of a scientific experiment are, in some greater sense, “true.” See POPPER, supra, at 195 
(discussing “the idea of a reproducible physical effect—an idea which is closely connected with 
that of objectivity”).  
 5. Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612. 
 6. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 7. See, e.g., In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(disallowing postapplication evidence to satisfy enablement); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 
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pharmaceutical manufacturers often structure drug development and 
clinical research around patent protection,8 patent law’s deficiencies 
with respect to disclosure encourage manufacturers to engage in 
research—often, irreproducible research—that satisfies the bare 
minimum needed to obtain protection. This failure of patent law 
exacerbates the current real-world reproducibility crisis.9 This Article 
is the first to explore how patent law—in particular, the weakness of 
patent law’s enablement doctrine—has contributed to failing standards 
of scientific integrity despite its constitutional objective “to promote 
the Progress of Science.”10 
Ironically, this disconnect stems from the mechanism by which 
patents are supposed to promote scientific progress: disclosure. Patents 
serve as a quid pro quo: inventors publicly disclose their inventions in 
return for exclusionary rights. Patent law, in turn, governs the 
substance and form of inventors’ disclosures.11 To that end, patent law’s 
 
F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (allowing an amendment—and rejecting the defendant’s theory 
of invalidity—to redefine a scientifically dynamic claim term); Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, 
Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting evidence that a patent failed to disclose an 
important method of practicing the invention). 
 8. See Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Firms Underinvest in Long-
Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2045–46 (2015) 
(describing how the structure of the patent system perverts clinical trial structures). 
 9. Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612 (discussing reproducibility in the context of 
preclinical drug studies). See generally Nicholas S. Downing et al., Clinical Trial Evidence 
Supporting FDA Approval of Novel Therapeutic Agents, 2005–2012, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 368 
(2014) (empirically assessing the reproducibility of new, and presumably patented, drugs); 
Douglas F. Easton et al., Gene-Panel Sequencing and the Prediction of Breast Cancer Risk, 372 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2243 (2015) (analyzing the lack of reproducibility for several patented gene-
panel sequencing tests); John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, 
2 PLOS MED. 696 (2005) [hereinafter Ioannidis, Research Findings] (theorizing the 
irreproducibility of clinical trials for popular drugs); John P.A. Ioannidis, Contradicted and 
Initially Stronger Effects in Highly Cited Clinical Research, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 218 (2005) 
[hereinafter Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects] (examining the irreproducibility of certain high-
profile drugs and clinical studies); John P.A. Ioannidis, Evangelina E. Ntzani, Thomas A. 
Trikalinos & Despina G. Contopoulous-Ioannidis, Replication Validity of Genetic Association 
Studies, 29 NATURE GENETICS 306 (2001) [hereinafter Ioannidis et al., Replication Validity] 
(assessing the same for genetic studies); Joseph Lau, John P.A. Ioannidis & Christopher H. 
Schmid, Summing Up Evidence: One Answer Is Not Always Enough, 351 LANCET 123 (1998) 
(describing the need for multiple studies to assess reproducibility for patented drugs); Jeffrey T. 
Leek & Roger D. Peng, P Values Are Just the Tip of the Iceberg, 520 NATURE 612 (2015) 
(recounting the difficulties in using certain statistical measures for biomedical research); Donald 
W. Light & Joel Lexchin, Why Do Cancer Drugs Get Such an Easy Ride?, 350 BMJ h2068 (2015) 
(examining the role of irreproducibility in patented cancer drugs).  
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 11. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 184 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (“[C]ompliance with 
section 112 . . . is not directed to the existence of usefulness but to what an inventor must disclose 
as the quid pro quo for patent protection.”). 
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doctrine of enablement canonically requires patents “to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use” the 
invention.12  
But this distillation of enablement complicates as many issues as it 
simplifies. Courts have long struggled with whether to admit evidence 
arising after the application for a patent to demonstrate its 
enablement—or lack thereof—at the time of its application.13 Courts 
have also had difficulty measuring the breadth of the doctrine: whether 
it applies to the full scope of a patent’s claims—the metes and bounds 
of the patent grant—or merely a subset.14 And the doctrine seems to 
be confusingly intertwined with another patent law doctrine—utility—
that only appears to overlap in narrow cases.15 Consequently, patent 
law’s enablement doctrine has failed to address how to treat follow-on, 
validating research; it is unclear whether such studies can be used as 
evidence in enablement disputes. And even if they can, courts have 
struggled to align follow-on research to claim language, utility 
concerns, and shifting clinical paradigms. 
These problems highlight the difference between science’s 
dynamism—its continuous resolution of prior inconsistencies—and 
patents’ static nature. The ability to replicate previous results to 
determine their veracity—scientific reproducibility—makes the canon 
of scientific knowledge, unlike patent law, an ever-moving target.16 In 
particular, several major investigations have found that many large and 
 
 12. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).  
 13. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083, 
1098–105 (2009) (discussing this difficulty concerning unforeseeable “after-arising” technology); 
Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2005) (“On the question 
of whether the definition of an invention reaches beyond the state of the art at the time of the 
invention, the contradictions are most striking in the doctrines related to how far a patent holder 
can reach toward later inventions.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim 
Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 106–07 (2005) (discussing several cases in which claim terms 
appear to have changed due to later scientific advances). 
 14. See Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1378 (2014) 
(describing this difficulty as “unworkable”). 
 15. See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(merging the two doctrines where the patent described a “nonsensical” method of operation).  
 16. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 111 (3d ed. 1996) 
(describing normal science as a series of ever-moving “paradigm shifts”); POPPER, supra note 4, 
at 281 (“Science never pursues the illusory aim of making its answers final, or even probable. Its 
advance is, rather, towards an infinite yet attainable aim: that of ever discovering new, deeper, 
and more general problems, and of subjecting our ever tentative answers to ever renewed and 
ever more rigorous tests.”).  
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expensive clinical research efforts are, in fact, irreproducible.17 This is 
particularly problematic for new drugs, where studies mandated—and 
approved—by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have 
later been cast into doubt.18 This has led even the most ardent 
advocates of administrative-agency-supported science to concede the 
“troubling frequency of published reports that claim a significant 
result, but fail to be reproducible.”19 
Patent law’s lack of concern for reproducibility has therefore had 
a pernicious effect on the reproducibility of clinical research. Because 
patent law places time constraints on delaying patent applications, 
pharmaceutical developers have powerful incentives to apply for 
patents early, on little and irreproducible data.20 This, in turn, has 
encouraged pharmaceutical developers to structure their clinical trials 
around indications that fall within their patents’ claims, even if such 
claims cannot be reproduced or are clinically meaningless.21 Several 
blockbuster drugs—Prempro, Xigris, Plavix, and Avastin—highlight 
these difficulties. In each case, the early patenting of the drug, on 
demonstrably irreproducible data, drove the developer to structure 
clinical trials for indications that were later withdrawn after coming 
under FDA scrutiny.22 This incentive to rush to both the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO) and the FDA bears significant social 
costs: it motivates pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop easily 
 
 17. Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612–13; Downing et al., supra note 9, at 372–76; Easton 
et al., supra note 9, at 2243; Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 218; Ioannidis et al., 
Replication Validity, supra note 9, at 306; Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 696; Lau, 
Ioannidis & Schmid, supra note 9, at 123; Leek & Peng, supra note 9, at 612; Randall J. LeVeque, 
Ian M. Mitchell & Victoria Stodden, Reproducible Research for Scientific Computing: Tools and 
Strategies for Changing the Culture, COMPUTING SCI. & ENGINEERING, July/Aug. 2005, at 13; 
Stodden, Reproducing Statistical Results, supra note 4, at 5–15; Yale Law Sch. Roundtable on 
Data and Code Sharing, Reproducible Research, COMPUTING SCI. & ENGINEERING, Sept./Oct. 
2010, at 8; Light & Lexchin, supra note 9, at h2068. 
 18. See, e.g., Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 220–23 (describing forty-five 
such studies, including tamoxifen, enalapril, and pravastin).  
 19. Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612.  
 20. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 
65, 93–96 (2009) (describing the downsides of early patent filing). 
 21. Cf. Tito Fojo & David R. Parkinson, Biologically Targeted Cancer Therapy and Marginal 
Benefits: Are We Making Too Much of Too Little or Are We Achieving Too Little by Giving Too 
Much?, 16 CLINICAL CANCER RES. 5972, 5973 (2010) (criticizing the FDA approval process for 
narrow therapies of patented medications); Tito Fojo & Christine Grady, How Much Is Life 
Worth: Cetuximab, Non–Small Cell Lung Cancer, and the $440 Billion Question, 101 J. NAT’L 
CANCER INST. 1044, 1045 (2009) (questioning the clinical meaningfulness of patented cetuximab).  
 22. See infra Part III.B.  
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patentable, often futile drugs;23 it furthers secrecy in clinical trials;24 and 
it dissuades competitors from researching alternative uses to known, 
patented therapeutics.25 For cancer drugs in particular, this disconnect 
between easy patenting and difficult clinical trials has encouraged drug 
manufacturers to develop weak but easily patentable and approvable 
treatments over more difficult cures and preventative therapeutics.26 A 
recent study in the American Economic Review calculated the 
monetary and human cost in this shift: “890,000 lost life-
years . . . [valued] on the order of $89 billion.”27 
Ultimately, this tension between the enablement doctrine and 
scientific advancement illuminates several scholarly debates 
concerning patents as a quid pro quo of property for progress. First, it 
strongly suggests that enablement should take into account after-
arising evidence. Patents with claims that are later to be found to be 
nakedly irreproducible simply do not enable others to “make and use” 
them—nor did they at the time the patent was filed. Invalidating claims 
like these should not turn on whether a follow-on study was published 
after a patent application was filed. Rather, they should rest on what 
the after-arising data mean about the invention at the time the 
invention was created. Relatedly, this suggests that technology-specific 
effects in patent law can be a normative good.28 Holding 
pharmaceutical patents to a higher enablement standard, for example, 
may encourage better preclinical trials or may shift drug developers’ 
research priorities to longer-term, more statistically robust projects. 
Second, this tension demonstrates patents’ limits as vehicles of useful 
scientific disclosure. Despite some scholars’ advocacy for patents as 
 
 23. Budish, Roin & Williams, supra note 8, at 2077 (discussing tamoxifen); Fojo & Grady, 
supra note 21, at 1045 (discussing cetuximab).  
 24. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. 
TECH. L. REV. 345, 382–83 (2007). 
 25. See id. at 370; Anna B. Laakmann, A Property Theory of Medical Innovation, 56 
JURIMETRICS J. 117, 157–58 (2016). Laakman states:  
Firms generally refrain from developing unpatentable inventions, and manufacturers 
stand to gain little from performing risky, rigorous clinical trials to study off-label uses 
of licensed drugs. Inherent drawbacks of relying on current market-based mechanisms 
to encourage the production of this type of information resource make it an attractive 
target for policy intervention.  
Id. (footnote omitted).  
 26. Budish, Roin & Williams, supra note 8, at 2049.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Contra Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1616–30 (2003).  
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fonts of scientific information,29 it seems clear that patents, especially 
for complex or statistically bound inventions, routinely disclose 
information that does not meet the strictures of scientific publishing. 
And third, framing enablement as incongruent with scientific norms 
suggests an easy distinction between the oft-confused enablement and 
utility doctrines: claims that are mathematically or physically 
impossible fail for a lack of utility; claims that are proven wrong or 
overbroad by a later statistical analysis should fail for a lack of 
enablement.  
Part I of this Article examines the norm and importance of 
reproducibility in science, as well as recent concerns over 
irreproducibility, especially in the context of clinical trials. Part II 
reviews patent law’s doctrine of enablement, and its difficulties, with 
respect to reproducibility. Part III then examines the intersection 
between enablement and irreproducibility in the context of 
pharmaceutical patents. It analyzes pharmaceutical developers’ 
incentives to file patents based on irreproducible data. It describes four 
such cases, all for blockbuster drugs—Prempro, Xigris, Plavix, and 
Avastin. And it also details some of the social costs of such a system. 
Lastly, Part IV explains how this Article resolves several current 
scholarly debates over the role of enablement and disclosure in the 
patent system. 
I.  SCIENTIFIC IRREPRODUCIBILITY 
A. The Importance of Reproducibility in Science 
Ideally, science proceeds by hypothesis testing—by generating 
hypotheses about natural phenomena and subjecting those hypotheses 
to rigorous testing.30 When testing conclusively confirms or refutes a 
hypothesis being investigated, scientists will then often report on their 
findings and subject their report to “peer review,” an assessment by 
 
 29. See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
621, 624 (2010). 
 30. POPPER, supra note 4, at 9. Popper writes:  
From a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any way—an anticipation, 
a hypothesis, a theoretical system, or what you will—conclusions are drawn by means 
of logical deduction. . . . [T]here is the testing of the theory by way of empirical 
applications of the conclusions which can be derived from it. The purpose of this last 
kind of test is to find out how far the new consequences of the theory—whatever may 
be new in what it asserts—stand up to the demands of practice, whether raised by 
purely scientific experiments, or by practical technological applications. 
Id.  
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other peer scientists of the testing design, the conduct of the 
experiments, and the conclusions drawn by the original investigator.31 
Once a report survives peer review—arguably the superlative standard 
in scientific publishing32—other scientists can then adopt and 
internalize the report’s findings.33 Future scientists may then use the 
information validated in the original report to generate new 
hypotheses and to subject those hypotheses to tests, reporting, peer 
review, and so on. In this way, science carefully and incrementally 
advances.34 
In reality, however, science does not ossify around past 
publications.35 The skepticism inherent in the scientific method that 
gives rise to experimentalism and peer review also engenders a 
ceaseless drive for certainty, even with otherwise strong confirming 
evidence.36 In that spirit, scientists often attempt to replicate each 
other’s experiments—both to generate hypotheses of their own and 
 
 31. ADIL E. SHAMOO & DAVID B. RESNIK, RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH 69–70 
(2d ed. 2009) (discussing the components of successful collaboration among scientists).  
 32. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1, 6 (2006) (“Peer review is commonplace, indeed, fundamental, to the practice of science. It is 
the gold standard for determining publication and general acceptance of scientific research.”). 
 33. Effie J. Chan, Note, The “Brave New World” of Daubert: True Peer Review, Editorial 
Peer Review, and Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 100, 114 (1995) (“Scientific progress results 
when a claim is repeatedly confirmed by the testing of true peer review. . . . It becomes part of the 
fund of scientific knowledge from which further scientific advances may be made.”). 
 34. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1055 (1989). Eisenberg states:  
[F]ree access promotes scientific progress by permitting other scientists to use prior 
discoveries in subsequent research. . . . It may be that most if not all new discoveries 
build upon prior discoveries, and that scientists therefore need to use prior discoveries 
in order to advance the state of scientific knowledge. 
Id.  
 35. See LARRY LAUDAN, PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS: TOWARDS A THEORY OF 
SCIENTIFIC GROWTH 25 (1977). Laudan asserts:  
One of the richest and healthiest dimensions of science is the growth through time of 
the standards it demands for something to count as a solution to a problem. What one 
generation of scientists will accept as a perfectly adequate solution will often be viewed 
by the next generation as a hopelessly inadequate one. 
Id.  
 36. See Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility, 450 NATURE 33, 33 (2007). Jasanoff states: 
The great mystery of modernity is that we think of certainty as an attainable state. 
Uncertainty has become the threat to collective action, the disease that knowledge 
must cure. It is the condition that poses cruel dilemmas for decision-makers; that must 
be reduced at any cost; that is tamed with scenarios and assessments; and that feeds the 
frenzy for new knowledge, much of it scientific. 
Id.  
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also to provide a further check on the peer-review process.37 The 
success or failure of these attempts to replicate prior results is often 
measured as a study’s “reproducibility”: whether a published 
experiment is, in fact, reproducible by an independent group of 
researchers.38 If a research result is not reproducible—if other 
investigators cannot obtain the same results as the original 
investigators, using the same methods—there is good reason to doubt 
the original result even if the prior work was subjected to the peer-
review process.39 In this way, science is largely self-correcting: “[E]rrors 
are systematically criticized and fairly often, in time, corrected.”40 
There are countless ways for scientific experiments to fail. And 
there are myriad ways to assess experiments’ reproducibility. Recently, 
Victoria Stodden has categorized the facets of reproducibility into 
three groups: empirical reproducibility, statistical reproducibility, and 
computational reproducibility.41 Empirical reproducibility is the 
classical kind: whether, given enough information about an 
experiment’s conditions, parameters, and equipment, an independent 
researcher can obtain the same results as those previously published.42 
Concerns over this sort of reproducibility date back to at least the 
seventeenth century, arising from a dispute between Christiaan 
Huygens and Robert Hooke over the suspension, or lack thereof, of 
expurgated water in glass columns.43 Statistical reproducibility, by 
contrast, concerns whether an experiment can be repeated with the 
same degree of statistical certainty as its predecessor, or whether the 
conclusions of the original study’s authors were statistically sound.44 
Errors in the application of certain statistical methods, data collection, 
 
 37. See COLLINS, supra note 4, at 29–50 (discussing the role of replication in scientific 
practice). But see Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 1049–51 (describing the lack of practical incentives 
for replication studies). 
 38. See Victoria Stodden, Reproducibility, in THIS IDEA MUST DIE: SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 
THAT ARE BLOCKING PROGRESS 529, 529–31 (John Brockman ed., 2015). 
 39. See Bruce Alberts et al., Self-Correction in Science at Work, 348 SCIENCE 1420, 1420–22 
(2015) (discussing reproducibility as science’s “[s]elf-correction” mechanism). 
 40. Id. at 1420 (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH 
OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 293 (1963)). 
 41. Stodden, supra note 38, at 529–31. 
 42. Id. at 529. 
 43. ROBERT D. PURRINGTON, THE FIRST PROFESSIONAL SCIENTIST: ROBERT HOOKE AND 
THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON 48–50 (Eberhard Knobloch, Helge Kragh & Erhard Scholz 
eds., 2009) (describing the resolution of Huygens’s and Hooke’s conflicting experiments in the 
1660s as the driver for the Royal Society’s focus on reproducibility); see also Stodden, supra note 
38, at 529. 
 44. Stodden, supra note 38, at 531. 
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and sample sizes, for example, can generate statistically irreproducible 
results.45 Computational reproducibility is a more modern concern: 
whether, given “changes in scientific practice and reporting standards 
to accommodate the use of computational technology . . . the same 
results can be obtained from the data and code used in the original 
study.”46 An increasing number of scientific disciplines—for example, 
meteorology, astronomy, and molecular biology—rely on code to test 
hypotheses and generate results. Understanding and being able to use 
that code has become critical in ascertaining whether previously 
published results are, in fact, reproducible.47 
No matter the label, “[t]he ability of other investigators to 
replicate the experiments by following the method in the published 
report is crucial to the advancement of science.”48 It is “the touchstone 
of the scientific method and one of the strongest norms of the research 
community.”49 
B Recent Concerns over Irreproducibility 
Recently, several researchers, including the former director of the 
NIH, Francis S. Collins, voiced their concerns that many peer-
reviewed, published scientific studies were irreproducible—or, at the 
very least, not replicable.50 Although outright fraud was extremely 
rare—only twelve cases in 2011 out of thousands of studies 
performed51—Collins and Lawrence A. Tabak, the principal deputy 
director of the NIH, attributed this crisis in reproducibility to “a 
complex array of other factors”: 
[P]oor training of researchers in experimental design; increased 
emphasis on making provocative statements rather than presenting 
 
 45. Stodden, Reproducing Statistical Results, supra note 4, at 2–4. 
 46. Id. at 2. 
 47. Yale Law Sch. Roundtable on Data and Code Sharing, supra note 17, at 8 (“Massive 
computation is transforming science. This is clearly evident from highly visible launches of large-
scale data mining and simulation projects such as those in climate change prediction, galaxy 
formation and biomolecular modeling.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).  
 48. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 31, at 51. 
 49. Karshtedt, supra note 4, at 109. 
 50. E.g., Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612; Downing et al., supra note 9, at 368; Easton 
et al., supra note 9, at 2243; Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 218; Ioannidis et al., 
Replication Validity, supra note 9, at 306; Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 696; Lau, 
Ioannidis & Schmid, supra note 9, at 123; Leek & Peng, supra note 9, at 612; LeVeque et al., supra 
note 17, at 13; Stodden, supra note 4, at 1; Yale Law Sch. Roundtable on Data and Code Sharing, 
supra note 17, at 8; Light & Lexchin, supra note 9, at h2068. 
 51. Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612. 
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technical details; and publications that do not report basic elements 
of experimental design. Crucial experimental design elements that 
are all too frequently ignored include blinding, randomization, 
replication, sample-size calculation and the effect of sex differences. 
And some scientists reputedly use a ‘secret sauce’ to make their 
experiments work—and withhold details from publication or describe 
them only vaguely to retain a competitive edge.52 
Other researchers have examined these factors in depth. In a 
famous 2005 article, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, 
John P.A. Ioannidis claimed, “[F]alse findings may be the majority or 
even the vast majority of published research claims.”53 Ioannidis’s 
article criticized the lack of attention paid to experimental design and 
attempted to calculate how researcher bias—both statistical and 
psychological—contributed to such failures.54 The article developed 
metrics for assessing a given study’s “pre-study odds”55—the likelihood 
that a study will yield true or reproducible results given its  
design—with its “positive predictive value” (PPV)—the likelihood that 
a study is true given the results it generated.56 Studies with good 
experimental designs that yield narrow, powerful results are likely to 
be reproducible. Studies with poor experimental design that yield 
fantastical results are likely to be just that—fantastical.57 After 
assessing various types of studies, Ioannidis concluded that, generally, 
“a PPV exceeding 50% is quite difficult to get.”58 In some types of 
studies, such as “[d]iscovery-oriented exploratory research with 
massive testing,” Ioannidis calculated the PPV to be 0.1 percent.59 In 
other words, each result in such a study is likely to be irreproducible 
99.9 percent of the time.60 
Some of the biases studied by Ioannidis focused on the tools of 
statistical inquiry themselves.61 Researchers’ reliance on one such tool, 
 
 52. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 53. Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 696. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 697–98. 
 56. Id. at 696.  
 57. Id. at 700. 
 58. Id. at 699. 
 59. Id. at 700 (calculating the PPV to be 0.1 percent). 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 696–97 (discussing the statistical measurements of error, power, and significance); 
see also Stodden, Reproducing Statistical Results, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing statistical 
irreproducibility). 
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statistical significance (p), has raised some particularly thorny issues of 
reproducibility. A 1998 study criticized the use of p-values in meta-
analyses of clinical trials.62 The measurement failed to take into 
account the heterogeneity of multiple studies, the studies’ differences 
in sample sizes, or certain random effects present in each study.63 This 
reliance on p-values cast doubt on the studies’ claims to causality and 
universality—in other words, the ability of future studies to reproduce 
the results seen in the aggregate.64 A similar practice, “p-hacking,” 
involves measuring different combinations of variables in the hope that 
one combination will produce statistically significant results—with 
reproducibility often a victim.65 And at its most extreme, researchers’ 
reliance on p-values has had the effect of creating competing, 
contradicted studies—later findings that came to the opposite 
conclusions of their predecessors.66  
Stephen T. Ziliak and Deirdre N. McCloskey have controversially 
derided this reliance on p-values as “the cult of p.”67 Even the Supreme 
Court—a court of law, not of math—has cast doubt on p’s importance. 
In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,68 the Court allowed 
shareholders of a drug manufacturer to pursue their securities claims 
against the company concerning its alleged misrepresentation of its 
drug’s side effects.69 The Court rejected the company’s defense that the 
lack of statistical significance between ingesting the drug and its side 
effects meant that such complications were merely “anecdotal.”70 “This 
 
 62. Lau, Ioannidis & Schmid, supra note 9, at 125. 
 63. Id. at 124–26. 
 64. Id. at 125. 
 65. Regina Nuzzo, Statistical Errors, 506 NATURE 150, 150–52 (2014) (describing one 
instance of p-hacking). For a general overview and estimation of the practice, see generally Megan 
L. Head et al., The Extent and Consequences of P-Hacking in Science, PLOS BIOLOGY, Mar. 13 
2015, at 1. For a humorous overview of the practice in clinical health studies, see Last Week 
Tonight with John Oliver: Scientific Studies (HBO television broadcast May 8, 2016).  
 66. See Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 223–26 (discussing the factors that 
contribute to contradicted findings). 
 67. STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF STATISTICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE: HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS US JOBS, JUSTICE, AND LIVES 9 (2008). 
 68. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011). 
 69. Id. at 30–31. 
 70. Id. at 39–40 (“Absent statistical significance, Matrixx argues, adverse event reports 
provide only ‘anecdotal’ evidence that ‘the user of a drug experienced an adverse event at some 
point during or following the use of that drug.’” (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 17, Matrix x 
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011) (No. 09-1156))). 
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premise is flawed,” concluded the Court, for many of the same reasons 
researchers have come to criticize the measurement.71  
Irreproducibility also stems from what Collins and Tabak dub the 
“secret sauce,” where researchers “withhold details from publication 
or describe them only vaguely to retain a competitive edge.”72 One 
medical diagnostics company, Theranos, attempted—and 
spectacularly failed—to bank on this asymmetry, by trying to protect 
its methods and results as trade secrets rather than subjecting its 
products to peer review or disclosing them in patents.73 Researchers 
criticized the company for engaging in “stealth research,” where there 
was little hope of having “its methods and technologies scrutinized and 
validated by independent scientists.”74 Indeed, it took a 
comprehensive, long-term investigation by Wall Street Journal reporter 
John Carreyrou to find that many of Theranos’s test results—some of 
which appeared fraudulent—could not be reproduced by gold-
standard, hospital-grade laboratory tests.75 
In other instances, reproducibility appears impossible because 
researchers simply refuse to adequately disclose their methods in 
obtaining computational results.76 In the precision-medicine context—
where scientists attempt to link individual genetic variations to 
disease—clinicians often rely on “opaque computational models to 
 
 71. See id. at 40 (discussing the impossibility of obtaining statistically significant 
measurements for small samples, alternatives to statistical significance for expert testimony on 
causation, and the FDA’s use of statistical significance—or lack thereof—for postmarket 
surveillance of approved drugs). 
 72. Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612 (footnote omitted). 
 73. John P.A. Ioannidis, Stealth Research: Is Biomedical Innovation Happening Outside the 
Peer-Reviewed Literature?, 313 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 663, 663 (2015). 
 74. Id. at 664. 
 75. See John Carreyrou, Hot Startup Theranos Has Struggled with Its Blood-Test Technology, 
WALL STREET J. (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-has-struggled-
with-blood-tests-1444881901 [https://perma.cc/EFJ4-P579]. John Carreyrou’s investigation into 
Theranos’s reproducibility issues and corporate behavior has been a saga unto itself. His work on 
the Theranos case led the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to propose sanctions on 
the company for misbehavior. Letter from Karen Fuller, Manager, State Oversight and CLIA 
Branch, Div. of Survey and Certification, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Sunil Dhawan, 
Dir., Elizabeth Holmes, Owner, and Ramesh Balwani, President, Theranos, Inc. (Mar. 18, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/hhslettertheranos.pdf [https://perma.cc/LPF7-
7JBS]. This reporting garnered Carreyrou the 2015 George Polk Award for Financial Reporting. 
Press Release, Long Island Univ., Long Island University Announces 67th Annual George Polk 
Awards in Journalism (Feb. 14, 2016), http://www.liu.edu/~/link.aspx?_id=125E54C4CDB14A2
E87A9C305A390C0F8&_z=z [https://perma.cc/6UFP-YVEP]. 
 76. Victoria Stodden, Trust Your Science? Open Your Data and Code, 2011 AMSTAT NEWS 
21, 21; Yale Law Sch. Roundtable on Data and Code Sharing, supra note 17, at 8. 
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make decisions related to health care,” what W. Nicholson Price II calls 
“black-box medicine.”77 “Secrecy, however, is a problematic incentive 
for the datasets underpinning the development of black-box medicine 
and makes method validation impossible.”78 Without external 
validation, any scientific finding using these models simply “retains 
whatever biases or errors may have created problems in the first 
place.”79 And disconcertingly, “the FDA currently lacks the expertise 
and resources to independently replicate a company’s algorithmic 
results.”80 
Even when innovative companies do seek out patents on  
their work—and, consequently, disclose their methods to the  
public—follow-on researchers have no greater guarantee that the most 
important aspects of those companies’ data will be reproducible. 
Myriad Genetics, for example, patented two genes related to breast 
cancer risk, BRCA1 and BRCA2, as well as methods of testing them, 
before having such patents struck down by the Supreme Court.81 But 
Myriad kept—and continues to keep—a secret database of numerous 
variants of those genes in an attempt to command a competitive 
advantage over its rivals; by having a robust yet confidential database 
of these “variants of unknown significance,” Myriad hopes to attract 
clinicians’ business.82 Secrecy of this sort is simply “not independently 
verifiable or replicable.”83 In this way, companies have used patent 
protection—with its traditional celebration of disclosure—as little 
more than leverage to protect secret and potentially irreproducible 
technology.84 
These concerns with irreproducibility in scientific research are not 
just limited to problems in methodology. In some instances, the 
sensitivities of researchers’ physical tools are to blame. One study 
blamed poor materials as the culprit behind over a third of 
 
 77. W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 421 (2015). 
 78. Id. at 447. 
 79. Id. at 441. 
 80. Id. at 442. 
 81. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013). 
 82. John M. Conley, Robert Cook-Deegan & Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz, Myriad After Myriad: 
The Proprietary Data Dilemma, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 597, 613–16 (2014). 
 83. Id. at 635. 
 84. Dan L. Burk, Patents as Data Aggregators in Personalized Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. TECH. 
L. 233, 239–240 (2015); Jacob S. Sherkow & Christopher Scott, Myriad Stands Alone, 32 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 620, 620 (2014) (discussing Myriad’s patents as forming its secret database). 
Brenda M. Simon & Ted M. Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2753547 [https://perma.cc/A3X8-PRY5].  
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irreproducible studies.85 Antibodies—the workhorses of molecular 
biology, molecules thought capable of uniquely pairing to a single other 
molecule—have also recently been blamed for a rash of irreproducible 
studies.86 Improper use or characterization of antibodies can cause 
them to react with unintended molecules, resulting in both false 
positive and false negative results.87 In other cases, manufacturing 
variability within a single batch of antibodies can yield different results 
across different conditions.88 And even using “good” antibodies, slight 
changes in experimental conditions can move the needle on certain 
results.89 This has led several researchers to speculate that, at least in 
part, “antibodies are a major driver of what has been deemed a 
‘reproducibility crisis,’ a growing realization that the results of many 
biomedical experiments cannot be reproduced and that the conclusions 
based on them may be unfounded.”90 
C. Irreproducibility in Clinical Trials 
Although irreproducibility has the potential to threaten all areas 
of the scientific endeavor, it seems particularly poignant in biomedical 
research—and for clinical trials in particular.91 News reports have 
recently focused on one study that claimed that “[s]cientists in the 
United States spend $28 billion each year on basic biomedical research 
 
 85. Monya Baker, Irreproducible Biology Research Costs Put at $28 Billion Per Year, 
NATURE: NEWS, (June 9, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/irreproducible-biology-research-
costs-put-at-28-billion-per-year-1.17711 [https://perma.cc/K4XR-969C] [hereinafter Baker, 
Irreproducible Biology Research] (“Overall, the team found that poor materials made the largest 
contribution to reproducibility problems, at 36% . . . .”). 
 86. Monya Baker, Blame It on the Antibodies, 521 NATURE 274, 274 (2015) [hereinafter 
Baker, Antibodies]. 
 87. See id. at 275–76.  
 88. See id. 
 89. See id.  
 90. Id. at 274. 
 91. Id.; Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 613 (“The recent evidence showing the 
irreproducibility of significant numbers of biomedical-research publications demands immediate 
and substantive action.”); Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 700 (“As shown, the 
majority of modern biomedical research is operating in areas with very low pre- and post- study 
probability for true findings.”); Baker, Irreproducible Biology Research, supra note 85, at 1; 
Jocelyn Kaiser, Study Claims $28 Billion a Year Spent on Irreproducible Biomedical Research, 
SCIENCE (June 9, 2015, 1:30 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/06/study-claims-28-
billion-year-spent-irreproducible-biomedical-research [https://perma.cc/ZXC7-5CAS] (“An eye-
popping $28 billion is spent in the United States each year on preclinical research that can’t be 
reproduced by other researchers. That’s the conclusion of a provocative analysis published today 
in part by economists who based it on past studies of error rates in biomedical studies.”) 
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that cannot be repeated successfully.”92 The study examined other 
reports of irreproducibility in an attempt to characterize and quantify 
their causes, finding that roughly 50 percent of all preclinical cancer 
studies contained at least one irreproducible result.93 Given that the 
United States spends roughly $56 billion each year on such studies, this 
amounted, in the authors’ view, to close to $28 billion of waste.94 
Economics aside, other investigators have delivered damning sermons 
about reproducibility in biomedical studies, with one report claiming 
that “47 of 53 landmark cancer research papers could not be 
reproduced.”95 Some have focused on irreproducibility as a function of 
the incentive structure of biomedical research, noting that “[c]onflicts 
of interest are very common in biomedical research, 
and . . . inadequately and sparsely reported.”96 And yet others have 
pointed to irreproducibility as a symptom of declining morale among 
biomedical researchers faced with daunting career challenges and, for 
academic researchers, faced with tenure pressures.97 
Clinical trials—studies of new drugs or devices to determine their 
safety and efficacy—seem particularly prone to claims of 
irreproducibility. Clinical trials often suffer from many of the ills that 
were found by Ioannidis to give rise to irreproducible results, including 
small sample sizes, small effects, a larger number of tested variables, 
an increasing flexibility in design, a greater potential for conflicts of 
interest, and a higher quotient of competitive popularity.98 One 
analysis of forty-nine “highly cited original clinical research studies” 
found that seven of the follow-on studies—16 percent—wholly 
contradicted their earlier studies’ findings.99 In one particularly 
egregious example, a 1991 clinical trial claimed that postmenopausal 
women receiving hormone replacement therapy were 44 percent less 
susceptible to coronary artery disease.100 A 2002 follow-up trial 
concluded, much to the contrary, that hormone replacement therapy 
 
 92. Baker, Irreproducibility Biology Research, supra note 85, at 1. 
 93. Freedman et al., supra note 2, at 3. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Baker, Antibodies, supra note 86, at 275. 
 96. Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 698. 
 97. See Alberts et al., supra note 39, at 1421. 
 98. Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 697–98. 
 99. Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 218. 
 100. See id. at 223 n.13 (citing Meir J. Stampfer et al., Post-Menopausal Estrogen Therapy and 
Cardiovascular Disease: Ten-Year Follow-Up from the Nurses’ Health Study, 325 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 756 (1991) [hereinafter Nurses’ Health Study]).  
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was responsible for a 29 percent increase in coronary artery disease.101 
Even where follow-on clinical trials do not contradict their 
predecessors, they may find no evidence to support the original study’s 
results, or find that the level of effect reported by the previous study 
was, in fact, substantially incorrect. Of the same forty-nine original 
clinical research studies, four found little evidence to verify the original 
clinical trials’ claims, while another seven concluded that the original 
study found substantially higher efficacy than warranted.102 In all, 
eighteen of the forty-nine clinical trials, or 36.7 percent, could not be 
reproduced.103 Perhaps equally concerning is that, to date, eleven of the 
original forty-nine clinical trials have yet to be challenged in any way.104 
Because clinical trials are almost always conducted for the purpose 
of receiving FDA approval to market a particular therapy, some of 
these failures in reproducibility stem from the agency’s standards for 
clinical trials.105 An exhaustive 2014 study that revisited the clinical trial 
data for all new drugs approved by the FDA from 2005 to 2012 
concluded that “[t]he quality of clinical trial evidence used by the FDA 
as the basis for recent approvals of novel therapeutic agents varied 
widely across indications.”106 Some of this flexibility is the product of 
necessity; “A perfect gold standard is not possible in clinical 
research.”107 Some may even “be warranted given the limited number 
of effective therapies and the poor prognosis associated with [diseases 
like] cancer.”108  
 
 101. Id. at 223 n.44 (discussing Writing Grp. for the Women’s Health Initiative Investigators, 
Risks and Benefits of Estrogen Plus Progestin in Healthy Postmenopausal Women: Principal 
Results from the Women’s Health Initiative Randomized Controlled Trial, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
321 (2002) [hereinafter Women’s Health Initiative Study]). Perhaps unsurprisingly, this seventy-
three-percentage-point swing resulted in a substantial products-liability lawsuit against the 
therapy’s manufacturer, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals. See Tobias Millrood, The Rise and Fall of 
Hormone Therapy, TRIAL, Aug. 2003, at 43–47 (describing class action litigation that resulted 
from health risks associated with the drug Prempro). 
 102. Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 222. 
 103. Id. This can be calculated by adding the number of clinical trials where later research has 
demonstrated a contradicted effect (seven), no effect (four), or a substantially diminished effect 
(seven). 
 104. Id. at 218. 
 105. Jonathan J. Darrow, Pharmaceutical Efficacy: The Illusory Legal Standard, 70 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 2073, 2093–95 (2013) (discussing the deficiencies in the FDA’s standards for clinical 
trials). 
 106. Downing et al., supra note 9, at 368. 
 107. Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 224. 
 108. Downing et al., supra note 9, at 373. 
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Nonetheless, several of the measurements allowed by the FDA to 
prove efficacy are particularly suspect. The use of surrogate rather than 
clinical end points—for example, measures of disease progression like 
the size of patients’ tumors as opposed to patients’ ultimate survival 
rates—stands out as a significant source of irreproducibility.109 “This 
reliance on surrogate outcomes leaves patients and physicians to 
extrapolate clinical benefits from trials, again raising questions about 
the certainty of the medications’ benefits in practice,”110 that is, that 
such results are not, in fact, real. Even clinical trials that do measure 
clinical end points like survival times often suffer from low effect sizes, 
a hallmark of irreproducible results.111 In the cancer context, subjects 
for seventy-one solid-tumor drugs approved by the FDA from 2002 to 
2014 improved their life span, at median, by only two-and-a-half 
months.112 Genetic-association studies—studies attempting to link an 
individual’s risk of developing a genetic disease, such as cancer, with a 
particular genetic variation—suffer from low effect sizes as well. What 
is more, attempts to replicate even successful studies have been met 
with skepticism if not outright backlash.113  
A lack of statistical power—the capacity of a study to detect the 
effect of a change on a studied population—appears to be another 
significant cause of irreproducible results in clinical studies. A 2001 
study of thirty-six genetic disease associations found that “[o]ften 
genetic associations of disease are of modest magnitude . . . and single 
studies are underpowered to detect them.”114 This lack of power 
contributed to the irreproducibility of prior studies linking certain gene 
variants to schizophrenia, dementia, hypertension, Parkinson disease, 
lung cancer, alcoholism, diabetic nephropathy, and others.115 Another 
 
 109. Id. at 374. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 697 (“The smaller the effect sizes in a 
scientific field, the less likely the research findings are to be true.”). 
 112. Light & Lexchin, supra note 9, at h2068 (“The 71 drugs approved by the FDA from 2002 
to 2014 for solid tumours have resulted in median gains in progression-free and overall survival 
of only 2.5 and 2.1 months, respectively.” (footnote omitted)). A similar subset of drugs approved 
by the European Medicines Agency found only a one-and-a-half-month gain. Id. (“A review of 
drugs for solid cancers approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in its first 10 years 
found that, overall, new oncology drugs improved survival by a mean and median of 1.5 and 1.2 
months, respectively.” (footnote omitted)). 
 113. See Kaiser, supra note 91 (describing efforts to replicate successful studies that have been 
met with skepticism). 
 114. Ioannidis et al., Replication Validity, supra note 9, at 308. 
 115. Id. at 307. The authors note: 
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study of commercially available multigene diagnostic tests casts doubt 
on the linkages between over a dozen genes analyzed by such services 
and cancer risk.116 Of the eleven commercial tests analyzed, every one 
tested for at least one such dubious genetic variant.117 
And yet, even when clinical trials meet the “gold standard” in 
terms of experimental design and predictive power,118 there is little 
guarantee that future trials will be able to reproduce their results. 
Jonathan J. Darrow has noted that “the statistical framework 
supporting the gold standard does not account for the possibility that 
drug companies may undertake multiple trials until one or more of 
them demonstrates efficacy.”119 Furthermore, even the gold standard 
is, itself, “inadequate because its statistical framework requires no 
particular level of efficacy.”120 In other words, even new drug 
applicants who adhere to the gold standard to conduct clinical trials are 
still free to employ a spaghetti-method approach to demonstrate 
efficacy—where “efficacy” is “not the drug’s level of efficacy per se, but 
rather the [statistical] relationship between the results from the control 
group and those from the active group.”121 This nuanced form of p-
hacking leads Darrow to conclude that the FDA’s “standard[s], along 
with the related concepts of gold standard testing, statistical 
significance, and clinical significance, do not prevent FDA approval of 
substantially ineffective remedies.”122 
Ultimately, quantifying the amount of irreproducibility in clinical 
trials may simply be impossible. Not every clinical trial is validated with 
 
Subsequent studies have failed to validate the originally proposed importance of 
dopamine receptor D3 gene polymorphisms for schizophrenia, of apolipoprotein E 
gene polymorphisms for dementia in patients with Down syndrome, of 
angiotensinogen gene polymorphisms for essential hypertension, of cytochrome p450 
2D6 (CYP2D6) gene mutations for Parkinson disease or of CYP2D6 metabolic status 
for lung cancer. Subsequent studies have confirmed that glutathione S-transferase M1 
status may be important in susceptibility to lung cancer, that dopamine receptor D2 
gene polymorphisms may confer some susceptibility to alcoholism and that 
angiotensin-converting enzyme gene polymorphisms may be involved in diabetic 
nephropathy; however, the strength of the associations found by the subsequent studies 
is significantly smaller than that postulated by the first studies for each of these three 
subjects. 
Id. 
 116. See Easton et al., supra note 9, at 2254. 
 117. Id. at 2242. 
 118. Darrow, supra note 105, at 2090 (enumerating several “gold standard[s]” in clinical trials: 
“randomization, double-blind administration, and placebo-control”). 
 119. Id. at 2095. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 2112. 
 122. Id. at 2076. 
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its own follow-on study, that, in any event, may suffer from its own 
deficiencies.123 Clinical trials—and even follow-on trials—are often 
conducted under the guise of FDA regulations, which have an 
instrumental rather than an investigatory bent.124 And new drug 
applicants can often keep their most damning negative results 
confidential under the FDA’s own regulations.125 As a result, 
“noncommercial researchers deprived of the means to independently 
re-analyze raw data cannot easily verify or refute product sponsors’ 
safety and efficacy claims.”126 
II.  IRREPRODUCIBILITY, DISCLOSURE, AND ENABLEMENT 
A lack of adequate disclosure accounts for much of today’s 
irreproducible research. The opacity of experimental design, the 
absence of technical details, and the convolution of statistical 
calculations all contribute to making follow-on research more difficult 
to perform and past research difficult to verify.127 To that end, patents 
may seem like a cure. Patents have long been described as a quid pro 
quo: the government grants to inventors the exclusive rights to their 
inventions only so long as they sufficiently disclose them.128 With an 
inventor’s disclosure, the public receives the technical knowledge 
contained in the patent as soon as it is published. And after the patent 
 
 123. Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 218. 
 124. Darrow, supra note 105, at 2075–76. 
 125. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 382–83. 
 126. Laakmann, supra note 25, at 133. 
 127. See supra Part I. 
 128. The first use of “quid pro quo” to describe this disclosure requirement was likely by Chief 
Judge William C. Coleman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland in Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co. in 1950 and famously repeated ten years later by the U.S. 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Nelson. Compare Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Esso 
Standard Oil Co., 91 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Md. 1950) (“But the quid pro quo is disclosure of a 
process or device in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention once 
the period of the monopoly has expired . . . .”), with In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 184 (C.C.P.A. 
1960) (“[C]ompliance with section 112 . . . is not directed to the existence of usefulness but to what 
an inventor must disclose as the quid pro quo for patent protection.”). Earlier cases, however, 
referred to the “quid” in the quid pro quo as the creation of something previously unknown to 
the public—not necessarily fully disclosing it. See, e.g., Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 
(1829). The Court in Pennock notes:  
If the public were already in possession and common use of an invention fairly and 
without fraud, there might be sound reason for presuming, that the legislature did not 
intend to grant an exclusive right to any one to monopolize that which was already 
common. There would be no quid pro quo—no price for the exclusive right or 
monopoly conferred upon the inventor for fourteen years.  
Id. 
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has expired, the public may then use and improve the invention 
without paying a royalty.129 This incentive to transfer knowledge is—at 
least, ideally—the mechanism by which patents “promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts.”130 
What constitutes a sufficient disclosure, however, is difficult to 
gauge. A patent that no one can practice makes the disclosure 
mechanism worthless—and the exclusive grant to the inventor rather 
costly.131 At the same time, the lay public cannot be expected to 
understand even valuable patent disclosures in highly technical 
fields.132 Garage-shop tinkerers are not expected to understand patents 
in the rocket sciences; rocket scientists’ patents should not be invalid 
for failing to educate them. 
 
 129. See Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 1022 (“This enabling disclosure becomes freely available 
to the public as soon as the patent issues; the patent holder may not thereafter monitor or control 
access to it.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548 (2009) (“[Patent 
disclosure] permits society at large to apply the information by freely making or using the 
patented invention after the expiration of the patent.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in 
Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 131 (2006) (“[T]he public benefits from the disclosure of the 
invention because the public storehouse of knowledge is thus enhanced, allowing others to rely 
upon the teachings of the patent to generate even further, follow-on innovation.”); Seymore, 
supra note 29, at 624 (“[T]he technical information disclosed in the patent document has potential 
immediate value to the public, which can use the information for any purpose that does not 
infringe upon the claims.” (footnote omitted)). 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Whether this ideal holds up in practice remains controversial. 
See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1623 (explaining that secrecy, rather than disclosure, 
facilitates software innovation); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of 
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 198–200 (1987) (arguing that publication 
norms in scientific research facilitate disclosure more than the patent system); Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 485–
88 (2008) (proposing that user-innovators’ disclosure preferences are not matched by the patent 
system). 
 131. See Fromer, supra note 129, at 552–53. Fromer notes: 
[P]atentees rationally have little to no incentive to offer more information than the 
patent laws require and have an incentive to obfuscate information they provide 
whenever possible. Inventors can seek to maximize their own competitive advantage 
by curtailing competitors’ use of information about the invention. In this way, they can 
make it harder for competitors to capitalize on the invention or related technologies, 
especially when the invention is groundbreaking. . . . These effects serve to prolong the 
inventors’ exclusive use, thereby enriching the original inventors.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 132. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 
785–87 (2011) (describing the complexities—legal and technical—of disclosures in patents); Mark 
D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72, 114 n.152 (2012) 
(“If the law required that the general public be able to read the patent and understand the 
invention based on little more than the patent document alone, every patent document would 
need to be a textbook on elementary concepts in order to satisfy the disclosure requirements.”); 
Seymore, supra note 29, at 624–25 (describing the patent document as a potential, and routinely 
unfulfilled, source of technical information). 
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The patent statute, title 35 of the U.S. Code, has therefore crafted 
the bargain that sufficient disclosures are those that “enable any person 
skilled in the art to which [the patent] pertains, or with which it is most 
nearly connected, to make and use the same.”133 Whether a patent 
accomplishes this turns on whether a person skilled in the art would 
need to engage in “undue experimentation” to practice the invention 
as described.134 Distinguishing undue experimentation from the merely 
routine requires an analysis of both the patent itself as well as the 
relevant art: the breadth of the patent’s claims, the nature of the 
invention, the state of prior art, the level of ordinary skill in the field, 
the art’s predictability, the amount of direction provided in the patent’s 
written description, whether any working examples exist, and the 
quantity of experimentation needed to successfully practice the 
invention.135 In all, enablement acts as one of “the most important 
patent doctrine[s],” serving multiple functions: “adequacy of 
disclosure, . . . the line of demarcation between the visionary 
theorist . . . and the visionary pioneer[,] . . . [and] the boundary 
between pioneer inventions and patentable improvements.”136 
This doctrinal complexity, however, fails to encourage 
reproducibility in patented disclosures. First, the Federal Circuit has 
presented conflicting views on whether evidence obtained after a 
patent application has been filed, such as follow-on research, can be 
used to prove (or disprove) enablement.137 This means that advances 
in science—important in verifying the research underlying a patented 
invention—can only rarely be used in assessing the scientific validity of 
 
 133. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 134. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 135. Id. Notably, these factors are “illustrative, not mandatory.” Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai 
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991). This analysis makes “[e]nablement, while 
conceptually simple . . . legally and factually complex.” Holbrook, supra note 129, at 129. 
 136. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., 
dissenting); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the 
Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 
23 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 38 (1995) (“Enablement is a particularly important limitation on the 
patentability of prophetic claims to inventions that the applicant has not yet actually reduced to 
practice.”); Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1, 13 (2012) (proposing that courts’ focus on claim language “assigns a very important role 
to enablement”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent 
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1050 (2003) (calling enablement “[t]he most important 
component of adequate disclosure”). 
 137. Compare In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(disallowing future evidence to satisfy enablement), with Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 
435 F. App’x 917, 925–26 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (allowing future evidence to satisfy enablement). 
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a patent’s claims.138 Second, the Federal Circuit has cobbled together a 
fractured jurisprudence on the scope, and consequently the 
verifiability, of the enablement determination—whether, for example, 
the full scope of a patent’s claims must be enabled or only a single 
embodiment.139 And third, in some instances, courts have confusingly 
amalgamated some aspects of enablement with a different patent 
doctrine, utility, creating a peculiar hybrid doctrine, “enablement 
utility,” that weakens the relationship between disclosure and 
reproducibility.140 These problems each show the difficulties in 
applying the enablement doctrine to evolving information and aligning 
patent law with ideals of reproducibility. 
A. Postapplication Evidence for Demonstrating Enablement 
There is an inherent disconnect between reproducibility and 
enablement. Reproducibility looks forward, assessing whether a prior 
study can be replicated in the future.141 But the “enablement 
determination is made retrospectively, that is, by looking back to the 
filing date of the patent application and determining whether undue 
experimentation would have been required to make and use the 
claimed invention at that time.”142 The PTO and federal courts do not, 
in theory, account for later developments in the art that would have 
enabled an otherwise defective patent application.143 This suggests that 
 
 138. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1098–1105 (discussing this difficulty concerning 
unforeseeable “after-arising” technology); Feldman, supra note 13, at 16 (“On the question of 
whether the definition of an invention reaches beyond the state of the art at the time of the 
invention, the contradictions are most striking in the doctrines related to how far a patent holder 
can reach toward later inventions.”); Lemley, supra note 13, at 106–07 (discussing several cases in 
which claim terms appear to have changed due to later scientific advances). 
 139. Compare MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (invalidating a patent for failing to fully enable the broad scope of its claims), with 
Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (concluding that the 
enablement requirement is satisfied “if the description enables any mode of making and using the 
claimed invention” (emphasis added)). 
 140. See Eli Lilly, 435 F. App’x at 925–26. 
 141. See supra notes 30–40 and accompanying text. 
 142. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 143. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1087. Collins notes: 
Because [after-arising technology] is by definition a technology that is not invented 
until after a patent application has been filed, it is difficult to understand how a 
specification can teach the [person having ordinary skill in the art] at the time of filing 
how to make and use [after-arising technology]. This conceptual difficulty has created 
a problem in contemporary patent law when literal claims encompass [after-arising 
technology].  
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enablement is, in fact, less concerned with whether an invention 
actually works and more concerned with the “draftsman’s art”144 of 
describing the invention as far along in the research process. 
In In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litigation,145 for example, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the invalidation of the plaintiffs’ patent 
covering a method of treating Alzheimer’s disease using 
galantamine,146 a common alkaloid extracted from various flowers.147 
The patent application at issue “conclu[ded] that it was possible to 
administer ‘an effective Alzheimer’s disease cognitively-enhancing 
amount of galanthamine [sic]’” on the basis of “short summaries of six 
scientific papers in which galantamine had been administered to 
humans or animals.”148 This, the Federal Circuit concluded, was a 
“mere research proposal”149 that “did not ‘teach one of skill in the art 
how to use the claimed method’ because the application ‘only 
surmise[d] how the claimed method could be used’ without providing 
sufficient galantamine dosage information.”150 The fact that later 
studies proved the inventor’s hypothesis true,151 or that the FDA 
eventually approved galantamine to treat Alzheimer’s,152 was 
irrelevant. 
But later research that illuminates a patent’s claims is not always 
irrelevant. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC,153 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that Eli Lilly’s patent 
 
Id.; see Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
127, 142 (2008) (“[T]he Examiner cannot use a reference to show lack of enablement based on 
later developments in the art.”). 
 144. Cf. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (noting that the need to describe what is 
being patented precedes the need to argue the discovery’s newness or obviousness). 
 145. In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 146. Id. at 1327–28. 
 147. See Michael Heinrich, Snowdrops: The Heralds of Spring and a Modern Drug for 
Alzheimer’s Disease, 273 PHARMACEUTICAL J. 905, 905 (2004). 
 148. In re ’318 Patent, 583 F.3d at 1321 (citations omitted).  
 149. Id. at 1324. 
 150. Id. at 1323 (alterations in original) (quoting In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 578 F. 
Supp. 2d 711, 736 (D. Del. 2008)). 
 151. See id. at 1328 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (“[L]ater animal studies and human clinical trials 
proved and confirmed galantamine’s effectiveness.”). 
 152. Letter from Robert Temple, M.D., Dir., Office of Drug Evaluation I, Ctr. for Drug 
Evaluation & Research, to Charles LaPree, Assistant Dir., Regulatory Affairs, Janssen Research 
Found. (Feb. 28, 2001), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2001/21169ltr.
pdf [https://perma.cc/V9X2-3RPQ].  
 153. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435 F. App’x 917 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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was invalid for lacking enablement.154 The patent covered a method for 
treating attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) using a newly 
created drug, atomoxetine.155 After a bench trial, the district court 
concluded that the patent was invalid for lacking enablement: “[T]he 
prior art stressed that the mechanism of action of ADHD was unclear 
at the time the patent application was filed,”156 the “patent contained 
no test data,”157 and clinical trials had yet to be performed.158 Even the 
inventor testified at his deposition, “I wasn’t sure at all that it would 
work.”159 But the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of 
invalidity because “[clinical trial] data were obtained shortly after the 
patent application was filed” and “experimental verification was 
obtained soon after the [patent application’s] filing.”160 This odd 
sequence of proof was necessary, in the appellate court’s view, because 
both scientific methodology and the PTO’s examining procedures 
commanded it. The former because “[s]cientific methodology today is 
based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be 
falsified.”161 And the latter because the utility of the invention was “not 
so incredible as to warrant the special procedures . . . for subject matter 
in once notoriously intractable [research] areas.”162 
Reconciling these two cases—and developing a working standard 
for when enablement can be demonstrated with postapplication 
evidence—remains difficult. Indeed, it highlights the disconnect 
between patent law’s enablement doctrine and standards of 
reproducibility. The patents in both cases were based on thin 
preclinical trial data. But in both cases, the preclinical trial data had 
been verified through later, more robust clinical experiments. Yet the 
different patent-validity outcomes between the two cases turned on the 
courts’ interpretations of whether there existed, at the time of the 
 
 154. Id. at 927. 
 155. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 731 F. Supp. 2d 348, 351–52 (D.N.J. 2010), aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part, 435 F. App’x 917 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
 156. Id. at 386. 
 157. Id. at 389. 
 158. Id. at 387–88. 
 159. Eli Lilly, 435 F. App’x at 923. 
 160. Id. at 924. 
 161. Id. (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic 
Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 
643, 645 (1992)). 
 162. Id.  
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patent applications, “a reasonable correlation between [the] 
compound’s activity and its asserted therapeutic use.”163  
This reasonable-correlation analysis focused not on whether the 
patents’ claims were likely to be reproducible, that is, true, but instead 
on whether they reasonably described a plausible therapeutic 
relationship.164 This reasonable-correlation standard—however 
grounded in formalistic patent doctrine—has little to commend it from 
a reproducibility perspective. Even if a patent application suggests a 
therapeutic correlation concerning a related but different drug than the 
one claimed, one would still need to engage in burdensome 
experimentation—gold-standard clinical trials—to determine whether 
the claimed drug indeed works as indicated. This was evident for the 
drugs in both In re ’318 Patent and Eli Lilly: the patent owners still 
needed to shepherd their drugs through years of clinical trials simply 
to determine whether they worked at all.165 
Similarly, advances in science may change the meaning of claim 
terms long after the ink has dried on the patent document.166 Courts 
interpreting claim terms with a particular scientific meaning are 
therefore confronted with several difficulties of time: whether to 
interpret those terms at the time of the patent application, at issuance, 
or after the patent has issued; whether to allow claim terms to shift 
meaning from one time to another; and whether others seeking to 
 
 163. Id. at 926 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T 
OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2107.03 (11th ed. 2013) 
[hereinafter MPEP]) (distinguishing In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1321 
(Fed. Cir. 2009)).  
 164. See id.  
 165. See In re ’318 Patent, 583 F.3d at 1328 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (“[L]ater animal studies 
and human clinical trials proved and confirmed galantamine’s effectiveness.”); Eli Lilly, 435 F. 
App’x at 919–20 (recounting the clinical trial history of atomoxetine). 
 166. See, e.g., Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 728 F.3d 1324, 1325 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (revisiting the meaning of the term “monooxygenase”); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 
222 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing the history of IFN-α-1); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 
595, 597, 608–09 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (reversing the examiner’s rejection on the ground that the term 
“normally solid homopolymer” had, since the time of filing, become indefinite); see also Dan L. 
Burk, Edifying Thoughts of a Patent Watcher: The Nature of DNA, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 
92, 95 (2013). Burk notes:  
The concept of a gene is entirely a human construct, and there is considerable room for 
debate as to what ought to be included in the concept of the gene, or, by the same 
token, what ought to be excluded from the concept of the gene. Some such constructs 
are more useful to humans than others, but the constructs themselves change over time, 
resulting in what we term scientific progress—we add or revise or amend the criteria 
for our constructs, subject to an array of social choices that yield amended or revised 
or additional outcomes. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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practice the patent would have recognized such shifts—and, if so, 
when. 
Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc.167 presents one of the starkest 
examples of these interpretive difficulties. In 1980, the patentee in 
Schering, Charles Weissmann, invented recombinant versions of a 
protein then known to scientists as “interferon,” an important 
component of the human body’s response to viral (and other) 
infections.168 His claims were accordingly limited to recombinant 
molecules of “interferon” and their attendant DNA sequences.169 
Almost immediately after Weissmann applied for his patent, however, 
scientific advances confirmed that what was previously known as 
“interferon” was actually a collection of several proteins, later named 
interferons alpha (IFN-α), beta (IFN-β), and gamma (IFN-γ). Each of 
these, in turn, was comprised of various subtypes, IFN-α-1, IFN-α-2, 
and so on.170 Now understanding that his recombinant protein referred 
to a single one of these subtypes—IFN-α-1—Weissmann amended his 
patent’s claims, changing “interferon” to “IFN-α-1.”171 In an 
infringement suit between the patent’s eventual assignee, Schering 
Corp., and Amgen Inc., the district court concluded that Weissmann’s 
amendment “did not merely replace the outdated term ‘leukocyte 
interferon.’ Rather, according to the trial court, the substitution 
imported years of scientific advance into the ‘901 patent’s disclosure 
and claims”—an act prohibited under the patent statute.172 Although 
the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s interpretation of 
Weissmann’s patent, it ultimately affirmed the district court’s finding 
of noninfringement: if IFN-α-1 meant only IFN-α-1, Schering 
recognized that it could not prevail at trial.173 
Schering highlights several of the difficulties of assessing 
enablement when courts confront claim terms with evolving scientific 
meanings.174 In these evolving-meaning cases, both the district and the 
appellate courts need to determine whether there is a salient difference 
 
 167. Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 168. See id. at 1349–50 (“[I]nterferons have important anti-viral and anti-tumor properties.”); 
see also STEPHEN S. HALL, A COMMOTION IN THE BLOOD: LIFE, DEATH, AND THE IMMUNE 
SYSTEM 131–58 (1997) (discussing the history of the discovery of interferon). 
 169. Schering, 222 F.3d at 1350. 
 170. See id. at 1349, 1352; HALL, supra note 168, at 178–208. 
 171. Schering, 222 F.3d at 1352. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 1349. 
 174. See id. at 1353 (“The scientific meaning of ‘IFN-α’ evolved with new discoveries.”). 
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between the disputed claim term—as used in the patent—and the term 
as understood in the scientific community after the patent had been 
filed. Without such a difference, the term’s definitional shift would not 
appear to alter the court’s invalidity or infringement analyses. In 
Schering, for example, had Weissmann’s particular use of the term 
“interferon” been equivalent to his colleagues’ understanding of  
“IFN-α-1,” then it would have mattered little whether a scientific 
understanding of “interferon” had changed over time. This 
determination is bound up with determining what aspects of the 
invention the inventor possessed at the time of filing,175 an analysis 
criticized by Robin Feldman as future “assumptions about how far a 
particular invention can reach.”176 
Courts must also determine when such a shift has occurred: 
whether prior to issuance or during patent prosecution—when, 
presumably, the inventor could have amended his claims—or much 
later, when presumably little could be done.177 Weissmann’s 
amendments in Schering were just that—amendments that he made 
during the prosecution of the patent—and he was therefore bound to 
the court’s ultimate infringement analysis.178 In another case, Bayer 
CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC,179 the patentee had not 
been so swift.180 There, the parties disputed when the patentees became 
aware that their use of the term “monooxygenase” had been essentially 
proven incorrect by later research.181 The Federal Circuit ultimately 
held this lapse against the patent owner and affirmed the district court’s 
invalidation of the patent.182 To resolve this apparent dichotomy, Mark 
 
 175. See Holbrook, supra note 129, at 132–33 (discussing the intersection of enablement and 
possession). 
 176. Feldman, supra note 13, at 25. 
 177. Even after a patent issues, however, a patentee is entitled to a “reissuance” of his original 
patent if, “through error, [the patent is] deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason 
of a defective specification or drawing.” 35 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2012). But it is unclear whether a 
scientifically evolving claim term constitutes “error,” as used in the statute. Generally speaking, 
the error must be inadvertent and the new claims must limit themselves to the same invention as 
the original application. See Laura A. Bauer, Modified Reissue Practice, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 193, 195, 
200–01 (1999). 
 178. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1353. 
 179. Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 728 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 180. Id. at 1328–29. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 1332. 
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A. Lemley has strongly argued to fix these inquiries—and the meaning 
of claim terms—on the date of the patent application.183 
Lastly, Schering demonstrates some of the procedural difficulties 
in making such nuanced assessments about the evolving scientific 
meaning of claim terms. According to Lemley,  
Doing so would require the scope of patents to change over time, not 
only for infringement purposes . . . but also for validity 
purposes. . . . Even after it issued, a patent’s scope would not be fixed, 
but could differ from infringer to infringer as time passes. As a result, 
the same patent could be valid at certain times and invalid at others, 
depending on the meaning of terms at the time of infringement. 
Further, claims valid at the time of issuance would become invalid for 
lack of enablement as the meaning of those claim terms 
changed. . . . No court has suggested that the meaning of patent 
claims for validity purposes should be mutable over time in this way, 
and the debilitating uncertainty associated with these changes 
counsels against adopting it.184 
Schering potentially suffered from just these sort of problems: the 
changing understanding of interferons would have meant that  
“IFN-α-1” took on different meanings for different defendants or that 
the patent could have withstood validity challenges on some days but 
not others.185 Cases like Schering ultimately show that science runs the 
risk of running away with the enablement inquiry. 
In this sense, the enablement doctrine, despite its nominal concern 
with whether others can actually work the patented invention, fails to 
properly account for a real, scientific basis that the invention actually 
works. Far from being a substantive test of the workability of the 
patentee’s disclosure, enablement may, like patentable subject matter, 
“depend simply on the draftsman’s art.”186 The onus therefore lies on 
patent attorneys to draft reasonable descriptions of plausible 
 
 183. See Lemley, supra note 13, at 115–16. 
 184. Id. at 116. 
 185. Regarding the former contention, that IFN-α-1 could have taken on different meanings 
for different defendants, this was, in substance, Schering’s infringement argument at trial: that 
IFN-α-1 covered a “mature” version of the protein, one made by the defendant, Amgen. 
Concerning the second contention, that scientifically evolving claim terms both wax and wane a 
patent’s validity, this is arguably why Schering was quick to drop its case after it lost its claim- 
construction ruling—an effort to preserve its patent’s validity. See D. De. Grants Judgment to 
Amgen So Opponent Can Appeal Markman Ruling, ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP., Apr. 5, 
1999, at 9 (discussing Schering’s strategy and the district court’s dismissal of Amgen’s invalidity 
counterclaim). 
 186. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). 
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therapeutic correlations between drugs and diseases, not on clinicians 
to investigate them. And enablement—the seemingly best outlet for 
encouraging the reproducibility of patented inventions—does very 
little work itself. 
B. The Scope of the Enablement Inquiry 
The enablement doctrine may also discourage reproducibility in 
patents for doctrinal rather than scientific reasons: the law is unclear 
how much of a patent needs to be reproducible to be enabled. 
Interpretations of enablement that allow some patent claims to be 
reproducible—although indifferent to the remainder—invite inventors 
to draft their patents to cover embodiments of their inventions that 
simply cannot be reproduced. This is complicated by the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisprudence on just what the enablement doctrine is meant 
to cover. Although it seems clear that the enablement doctrine 
operates on patents’ claims, rather than some abstract concept of “[the] 
invention,”187 the Federal Circuit has been “inconsistent and chaotic” 
in resolving the scope of the enablement inquiry.188 In several cases, the 
court appears to have haphazardly chosen among several 
irreconcilable alternatives to determine whether, and to what extent, 
enablement operates on the scope of a patent’s claims.189 In an effort 
to impart order on the court’s jurisprudence, Kevin Emerson Collins 
has broadly grouped the court’s decisions into three doctrines: the full-
scope doctrine, the single-embodiment doctrine, and the 
reasonableness doctrine.190 Each of these standards has encouraged 
research reproducibility differently. 
The full-scope doctrine requires that a patent’s specification 
enable the full scope of the patent’s claims.191 That is, the patent must 
enable every potential embodiment of the invention—every way or 
mechanism it can be achieved—arising from the way the claim is 
drafted. This has been likened to a commensurability requirement, 
 
 187. See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Because a 
patent specification must enable the full scope of a claimed invention, an enablement inquiry 
typically begins with a construction of the claims.” (citations omitted)); MPEP, supra note 
163, § 2164.08 (“All questions of enablement are evaluated against the claimed subject matter.”); 
Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1170–71 
(2014) (“[T]here is no concept of ‘the invention’ apart from the patent’s claims.”). 
 188. Collins, supra note 13, at 1087. 
 189. See id. at 1087–88. 
 190. Id. at 1088–89. 
 191. Id. at 1088. 
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where the patent’s disclosure must be commensurate with the scope of 
the patent’s claims.192 Under this theory, a patent that discloses 
anything less than all potential embodiments for its claims is invalid. 
Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories193 serves as a prime 
example of the doctrine at its most forceful. In Wyeth, the patentee 
claimed a method for treating restenosis, the narrowing of blood 
vessels, using “rapamycin.”194 The parties disputed, however, whether 
the claims’ use of the term “rapamycin” constituted a virtually limitless 
class of chemicals or a well-defined set of known drugs.195 When the 
court chose the former definition, it summarily invalidated the patent 
for lack of enablement, concluding that “practicing the full scope of the 
claims would require synthesizing and screening each of at least tens of 
thousands of compounds.”196  
This standard comports well with promoting reproducibility in 
preclinical research. The full-scope doctrine under Wyeth seems to 
encourage patent applicants to either generate enough robust evidence 
to prove the veracity of broad claims—perhaps by, indeed, screening 
tens of thousands of compounds—or by drafting their patents much 
more narrowly, to be commensurate with the research they can, in fact, 
perform. In either event, tethering enablement to a full-scope analysis 
pushes researchers to one of two sides of reproducibility: either better, 
more detailed preclinical research to include in broad patent 
applications or narrower claims to fit narrower conclusions. 
The single-embodiment doctrine, by contrast, is satisfied when the 
patent specification enables a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
create at least a single embodiment of the claimed invention.197 In 
Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc.,198 the Federal Circuit concluded 
 
 192. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.3d 731, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he claims must be 
commensurate with the inventor’s contribution.”); Collins, supra note 13, at 1086 (“More 
specifically, enablement employs the concept of commensurability to restrict claim scope: it 
mandates that the set of the technologies described by a claim remain commensurate with the set 
of technologies enabled by the disclosure.” (footnote omitted)); Karshtedt, supra note 4, at 1534 
(“[C]ommensurability between claim scope and disclosure . . . is understood to be a part of the 
enablement requirement in patent law.”); Seymore, supra note 29, at 634 (“The test is whether 
the enablement provided in the disclosure is commensurate in scope with the protection sought 
by the claims.” (footnote omitted)). 
 193. Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  
 194. Id. at 1382. 
 195. Id. at 1384–85. 
 196. Id. at 1385. 
 197. Collins, supra note 13, at 1088. 
 198. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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that the inventor’s patent on a gas laser was enabling, even though it 
failed to disclose one possible method for constructing it.199 This was 
“not fatal” to the inventor’s patent because in “an art where the results 
are predictable, e.g., mechanical as opposed to chemical arts, a broad 
claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment, and is not 
invalid for lack of enablement simply because it reads on another 
embodiment of the invention which is inadequately disclosed.”200 From 
a reproducibility perspective, this can be problematic. Inventions 
predicated on single working embodiments are akin to research 
conclusions based on low sample sizes. There is decreasing certainty 
that their results are, in fact, more generalizable to a broader 
population. 
Lastly, the reasonableness doctrine attempts to navigate between 
the first two. There, a patent application satisfies the enablement 
requirement when there is a “‘reasonable correlation’ between the 
disclosure and the claims.”201 Practically speaking, patent applicants or 
litigants have attempted to use this reasonableness doctrine in 
unpredictable arts where there is a wide disparity between the scope of 
their claims—broad—and the scope of their disclosure—often narrow. 
To support this analysis, defenders of the reasonableness doctrine 
often invoke another of the court’s patent doctrines, that of the 
“pioneering” inventor.202 Older court cases seem to have given leeway 
to inventors of pioneering inventions “in exchange for their outsized 
technological contribution to society.”203 Nonetheless, recent cases 
have rejected the use of the reasonableness doctrine as the touchstone 
for enablement.204 
Although the Federal Circuit’s language has recently been more 
forceful in adopting the full-scope doctrine as the polestar for 
 
 199. Id. at 1536–38. The patentee’s laser required securing several copper cups to the inside 
of the laser’s discharge tube and disclosed several methods of doing so. It failed to teach one 
method, however—the patentee’s own (and presumably proprietary) “six-stage [TiCuSil] braze 
cycle.” Id. at 1531. 
 200. Id. at 1533 (citations omitted). 
 201. Collins, supra note 13, at 1089. 
 202. See, e.g., Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (affirming the invalidation of a patent despite appellant’s challenge of the district 
court’s failure to make a finding as to the invention’s “pioneer” status); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 
495 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (invalidating the patent application’s claims even though “appellants assert 
that their invention is ‘pioneering,’ and that this should entitle them to claims of broad scope”).  
 203. Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 382 (2012). 
 204. See supra note 202. 
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enablement,205 it has yet to overrule either the single-embodiment or 
reasonableness doctrines. Confusion regarding the existence of these 
alternative doctrines and when they might be applicable continues to 
persist in the court’s own full-scope cases.206 And scholars have 
criticized the rule as “unworkable.”207 But this only further 
demonstrates the disconnect between encouraging thorough, 
painstaking clinical research and enablement’s lesser requirements for 
patentability. Concerning the latter, Bernard Chao has described the 
arguable inequities in requiring perfect reproducibility in patent 
applications: “There is always an unforeseen embodiment that falls 
within a claim. In many cases, that embodiment will not be enabled. 
But a claim should not be invalidated simply because the inventor did 
not foresee every embodiment that may eventually fall within its 
scope.”208 
C. The Enablement Doctrine’s Relationship with Utility 
Lastly, the enablement doctrine may also encourage 
irreproducible patent claims in the way it is assessed alongside another 
doctrine: utility. Indeed, in some circumstances, enablement and utility 
are often confused. This is problematic because the heart of the utility 
inquiry asks only whether an invention is theoretically possible, and not 
whether, on the whole, it is consistently reproducible. A merging of the 
two doctrines—as a few courts have done—allows patentees to claim 
inventions that are largely irreproducible but nonetheless possible. 
 
 205. See, e.g., Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“As 
the extensive evidence here demonstrates, undue experimentation would have been required in 
order to enable the full scope of coverage sought by Promega—the successful co-amplification of 
potentially thousands of unrecited STR loci combinations.”); Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott 
Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[W]e find no genuine dispute that practicing the full 
scope of the claims would require more than routine experimentation . . . .”); MagSil Corp. v. 
Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Hitachi has shown with 
clear and convincing evidence that one skilled in the art could not have taken the disclosure in 
the specification regarding ‘change in the resistance by at least 10% at room temperature’ and 
achieved a change in resistance in the full scope of that term without undue experimentation.” 
(quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,629,922 col. 8 ll. 50–54 (filed Mar. 21, 1995))). 
 206. See, e.g., Wyeth, 720 F.3d at 1386 (“Even ‘a considerable amount of experimentation is 
permissible,’ as long as it is ‘merely routine’ or the specification ‘provides a reasonable amount of 
guidance’ regarding the direction of experimentation.” (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 
Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1381 (“[T]he scope of the 
claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the 
specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Fisher, 
427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970))).  
 207. Chao, supra note 14, at 1378. 
 208. Id. (citations omitted).  
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Utility arises from § 101 of the patent statute, which only allows 
patents on “new and useful” inventions.209 This has long been “assumed 
to be a ‘low bar’ to patentability or a ‘nonexistent’ patentability 
requirement.”210 It demands only that the patented invention have 
some beneficial use to the public and that the patent itself “be capable 
of achieving the [invention’s] intended result.”211 Practically, these 
requirements set such low thresholds as to be overcome for almost all 
inventions except the fantastical: perpetual motion machines,212 
processes for cold fusion,213 and elixirs of eternal youth,214 for example. 
By contrast, enablement’s more robust standard requires that a patent 
actually teach persons having ordinary skill in the patent’s art “to make 
and use” the invention.215 
Despite this difference, some courts have confusingly merged the 
two doctrines. In classic enablement cases, courts have rejected patent 
applications because they simply do not contain enough information to 
allow a person having ordinary skill in the art to make and use the 
invention. In Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,216 the Federal 
Circuit concluded that Liebel-Flarsheim’s patent covering a syringe 
lacked enablement “because the specification [did] not describe a 
jacketless injector,” a required element of the patent’s claims.217 The 
court’s opinion intimated that, had the specification described 
jacketless injectors at all, it would have upheld Liebel-Flarsheim’s 
patent.218 
In other cases, however, enablement does not rise or fall on merely 
the quantity of information provided in the specification, but its quality. 
 
 209. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 210. Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1049 (2014) (citations 
omitted). 
 211. Id. at 1066.  
 212. Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 213. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863–64 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 214. In re Eltgroth, 419 F.2d 918, 922 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 215. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 216. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 217. Id. at 1375, 1378.  
 218. See id. at 1378–80. The court noted: 
The district court reasoned that the claims were invalid for lack of written description 
because the specification does not describe a jacketless injector. The court noted that 
the written description of the invention is directed to the improvement of ‘loading and 
unloading a syringe given the constraints presented by the pressure jacket.’ . . . The 
court further found that no prototypes of a jacketless injector had been made or 
described at the time of filing . . . . (citation omitted in original).  
Id. at 1375.  
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When the supporting information in the specification gives the patent 
examiner or the court some doubt that the invention will operate as 
described, the assessor will often conclude that the patent or patent 
application lacks enablement because the invention—even if it is 
physically reduced to practice—will not work as advertised.219 In other 
words, the patent disclosure, on its face, does not allow a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to use the invention. 
This is precisely what happened in Process Control Corp. v. 
HydReclaim Corp.220 In Process Control, the patentee claimed a 
method of using a gravimetric blender, a machine important in plastic 
injection molding.221 The patent’s claims required the blender to 
perform certain calculations when feeding its grist to a later machine, 
a hopper.222 Those calculations commanded the blender to determine 
a “material processing rate” by adding together the processing rate of 
the material to the hopper with the processing rate of material coming 
from the hopper.223 During claim construction, however, the district 
court determined that the patent’s use of the term “material processing 
rate” was no different from the processing rate of material to the 
hopper.224 This presented sincere problems in math; the patent 
required the blender to perform a calculation, A = A + B, that was, in 
some instances, mathematically impossible.225 The patent’s 
inoperability therefore rendered the patent invalid because it created 
“a nonsensical method of operation,” one which “fail[ed] to comply 
 
 219. See, e.g., MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (“The specification containing these broad claims, however, does not contain sufficient 
disclosure to present even a remote possibility that an ordinarily skilled artisan could have 
achieved the modern dimensions of this art.”); In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 
1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[W]ith regard to studies cited in the specification showing 
galantamine’s ability to reverse scopolamine-induced amnesia in normal rats . . . ‘[n]othing in this 
teaching leads to an expectation of utility against Alzheimer’s disease.’” (second alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)); Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1355 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The district court concluded that ‘[i]f “discharge rate” is construed as Process 
Control asserts [i.e., the same as the first occurrence of discharge rate], this specification would 
be nonsensical.’” (alteration in original) (quoting District Court order)). 
 220. Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  
 221. Id. at 1352–54. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 1354. 
 224. Id. at 1357. 
 225. Id. at 1359 (“In other words, clause [d] requires determining a quantity from the sum of 
that exact same quantity and something else, or symbolically, A = A + B, which is impossible, 
where, as here, B is not equal to zero.” (brackets in original)). 
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with the utility and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 
112.”226 
But most patents with inoperability concerns do not fail because 
their inventions violate fundamental laws of physics or math. Rather, 
putatively inoperable patents often fail simply because the 
specification fostered doubt as to the invention’s ultimate success.227 
This was the view of inoperability taken by the court in Eli Lilly, where 
the court struggled to make sense of the dearth of evidence that 
atomoxetine could be used to treat ADHD.228 There, the court referred 
to this intersection between enablement and utility as 
“enablement/utility.”229 As evidence for upholding the patent on these 
“enablement/utility” grounds, the court proffered both evidence from 
the patent’s specification as well as general scientific principles.230 
It is this view of enablement—or more precisely, equating 
enablement to inoperability in cases like Eli Lilly—that wrongly 
conflates the two doctrines. Viewed broadly, the utility requirement is 
simply concerned with whether the patent describes a use for its 
claimed invention—any use will do. If the patent is silent or hopelessly 
vague about the invention’s potential uses, or truly impossible as in 
Process Control, then it is fair to say that the patent does not describe 
 
 226. Id. (emphasis added). 
 227. See Karshtedt, supra note 4, at 111–13 (likening this aspect of inoperability to 
“unpredictable and unreliable” results (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988))); 
Seymore, supra note 210, at 1091. Seymore notes: 
This last point reveals the paradoxical nature of the modern utility requirement as it 
relates to disclosure. An applicant can assuredly disclose an invention which enables a 
PHOSITA to make and use the invention (like a chemical compound), but can 
nevertheless fail to meet the § 101 utility threshold because the subject matter is 
deemed to be a “mere research proposal” or “simply an object of research.”  
Id. (quoting In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 228. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435 F. App’x 917, 923–24 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
supra notes 152–61 and accompanying text. 
 229. Eli Lilly & Co., 435 F. App’x at 923. 
 230. Id. at 925 (“The district court’s statement that ‘there was no credible disclosure of utility 
to begin with’ does not comport with the specification’s extensive disclosure of utility.” (quoting 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Activis Elizabeth LLC, 731 F. Supp. 2d 348, 386 n.18 (2010))); id. at 926. The 
court noted: 
In the case of atomoxetine, however, the norepinephrine relationship was known, 
safety for antidepressant activity had been established, the specification contained a 
full description of the utility, experimental verification had been obtained before the 
patent was granted, and the examiner had not requested additional information. There 
was no evidence that the disclosure is “on its face, contrary to generally accepted 
scientific principles.”  
Id. (quoting In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).  
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even a single use for its claimed invention.231 By contrast, a patent 
should not fail for lack of utility if the uses it describes are plausible but 
ultimately specious. Determining whether such uses are, in fact, 
specious likely turns on whether someone can bring them into reality. 
That inquiry—whether a person having ordinary skill in the art can 
make or use the invention—is one for the doctrine of enablement, not 
utility.  
This distinction is critically important for unpredictable sciences 
and industries where trial and error is the order of the day.232 
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit has been clear that “[l]ack of 
enablement and absence of utility are closely related grounds.”233 
Although an inventor’s “misconceptions about scientific principles” 
will not often invalidate the patent,234 this joining of enablement and 
utility, even for well-supported but doubtful claims, remains. 
III.  IRREPRODUCIBILITY IN DRUG PATENTS 
A. Incentives for Irreproducible Drug Patents 
Despite enablement’s concern with disclosure and the workability 
of inventions, reproducibility seems to play little role in patent law. 
Patented inventions grounded in irreproducible science are not 
stripped of their patents as a matter of course. The most relevant 
doctrine, enablement, appears ill-suited to take irreproducibility into 
account: it is unclear whether any postapplication evidence can be 
introduced to invalidate patents based on irreproducible data, let alone 
general scientific advances that call into question prior assumptions 
about a particular field.235 Enablement’s relationship with the scope of 
patents’ claims—and, consequently, which aspects of patents may or 
may not be irreproducible—remains stubbornly unsettled.236 
Moreover, the doctrine remains confusingly mixed up with operability, 
 
 231. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, supra note 210, at 1087–91 (discussing Brenner v. 
Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1965)). 
 232. See Karshtedt, supra note 4, at 120–27 (describing this in the context of biotechnology 
process claims). 
 233. Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(citation omitted). 
 234. Id. at 1359. 
 235. See supra Part II.A.  
 236. See supra Part II.B. 
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a single concern in the broader concept of irreproducibility.237 In this 
sense, even though irreproducible patents can be thought of as 
disenabling, they remain entitled, as with other patents, to an ongoing 
presumption of validity.238 
This disconnect between reproducibility and enablement becomes 
particularly problematic in the case of patented drugs. The lifecycle of 
the drug-approval process—discovery, preclinical development, an 
Investigational New Drug Application with the FDA, three phases of 
clinical trials, and, finally, approval—counsels patenting early on, when 
very little data concerning drugs’ efficacy in their target populations is 
available.239 Indeed, because of the “statutory bars”—statutory limits 
on how long inventors have to file patent applications with the PTO 
after initially disclosing their inventions—“the patent laws actually 
penalize inventors who fail to file promptly.”240  
To avoid this, drug developers often rely on early preclinical 
studies to bolster their patents.241 By design, these studies often have 
small sample sizes; employ little statistical power; and, of course, suffer 
from conflicts of interest between industrial researchers and their 
 
 237. See supra Part II.C (discussing the differences among empirical, statistical, and 
computational reproducibility). 
 238. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435 F. App’x 917, 923–26 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (concluding that Eli Lilly’s 
patent satisfied the enablement requirement even though the defendant raised doubts about the 
studies included in the patent’s specification). 
 239. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(en banc) (Newman, J., concurring) (per curiam), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997) 
(“[T]he patent law places strong pressure on filing the patent application early in the development 
of the technology, often before the commercial embodiment is developed or all of the boundaries 
fully explored.”); Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 348 (“Basic ‘composition of matter’ patents on 
drugs are typically issued in the early stages of product development, before the effects of these 
molecules have been tested in clinical trials.”); Seymore, supra note 143, at 161–62 (quoting Hilton 
Davis and discussing this in the context of pharmaceutical development); see also Cotropia, supra 
note 20, at 93–96 (describing the negatives of early patent filing). 
 240. Seymore, supra note 143, at 162. 
 241. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. 
L. REV. 503, 539 (2009) (“Pharmaceutical patents are typically filed when drugs are in early 
preclinical research . . . .”). 
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employers242—all hallmarks of irreproducibility.243 Nonetheless, patent 
applications rooted in suspect data from preclinical trials do not suffer 
at the PTO. Rather, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
requires only a “reasonable correlation” between a drug and its 
asserted benefit,244 a standard that can be met with mere animal testing 
or in vitro analyses.245 The PTO even appears to acknowledge the 
deficiency of this approach, reminding its examiners that “[t]he 
applicant does not have to prove that a correlation exists between a 
particular activity and an asserted therapeutic use of a compound as a 
matter of statistical certainty.”246 
The early, easy patenting of drugs encourages patent applicants to 
adopt several troublesome strategies at the PTO. Patentees of new 
drugs, already encouraged to claim broadly,247 often draft their claims 
as directed to methods of treating broader classifications of diseases 
than any preclinical data warrants.248 U.S. Patent No. 8,652,776, for 
 
 242. See, e.g., Katherine S. Button et al., Power Failure: Why Small Sample Size Undermines 
the Reliability of Neuroscience, 14 NATURE REVS.: NEUROSCIENCE 365, 373 (2013) (describing 
these factors as “the root of the recent replication failures in the preclinical literature”); Ioannidis, 
Research Findings, supra note 9, at 697–98 (same). See generally David M. Katz et al., Preclinical 
Research in Rett Syndrome: Setting the Foundation for Translational Success, 5 DISEASE MODELS 
& MECHANISMS 733 (2012) (attempting to establish best practices for preclinical research for 
treatments of Rett syndrome); Iurii Koboziev, Fridrik Karlsson, Songlin Zhang & Matthew B. 
Grisham, Pharmacological Intervention Studies Using Mouse Models of the Inflammatory Bowel 
Diseases: Translating Preclinical Data into New Drug Therapies, 17 INFLAMMATORY BOWEL 
DISEASES 1229 (2011) (criticizing preclinical studies of inflammatory bowel disease in mice); 
Emily Sena, H. Bart van der Worp, David Howells & Malcolm Macleod, How Can We Improve 
the Pre-Clinical Development of Drugs for Stroke?, 30 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCE 433 (2007) 
(exploring the failures of preclinical studies in drugs for stroke); Hanna M. Vesterinen et al., 
Improving the Translational Hit of Experimental Treatments in Multiple Sclerosis, 16 MULTIPLE 
SCLEROSIS 1044 (2010) (criticizing preclinical research for multiple sclerosis treatments on 
various grounds).  
 243. Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 697–98.  
 244. MPEP, supra note 163, § 2107.03.  
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. (emphasis added). 
 247. Chao, supra note 14, at 1366–67 (“Patent attorneys draft claims as broadly as they can. 
In fact, they often deliberately seek overly broad claims in the hope that the patent office will 
accept them.”). 
 248. See Budish et al., supra note 8, at 2077 (“[T]he drug Tamoxifen was FDA approved for 
several cancer indications while on-patent; later, a publicly funded clinical trial supported the 1998 
FDA approval of Tamoxifen as a chemoprevention agent, preventing breast cancer incidence in 
high-risk groups.”); Feldman, supra note 13, at 13–15 (describing this in the context of antibody 
therapeutics); Eileen M. Kane, Patent-Mediated Standards in Genetic Testing, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 
835, 859 (“[T]he establishment of new mutations that are associated with clinical risk might rise 
to the level of ‘undue experimentation’ that would indicate a patent claim that is potentially 
broader than its disclosure.”); Price, supra note 77, at 445 (weighing similar incentives in the 
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example, generally claims a method of using iloperidone to treat “one 
or more symptoms of a psychotic disorder”—a virtually limitless 
category—even though the preclinical studies referenced by the patent 
refer almost exclusively to schizophrenia.249 Similarly, to the extent that 
a drug has multiple forms, patentees are encouraged to base their 
claims on the broadest genus of the drug, even if there is little data to 
support their claims.250 Patentees for new drugs also have little 
incentive to include in their applications a full description of the 
statistical methods used in any of their preclinical research. Rather, 
patentees are encouraged to say little about the methodology of any 
supporting studies and then wait for an examiner’s response.251 In that 
vein, the Federal Circuit’s conflicting decisions in In re ’318 Patent and 
Eli Lilly suggest that examiners’ objections to preclinical studies—if 
any—are of much greater consequence than whether the studies are, 
in any sense, reproducible.252 Lastly, patentees may also be encouraged 
to draft ambiguous claims in the hope of retaining textual flexibility as 
developmental research on the studied drug progresses.253 Claiming a 
method of treatment with keen specificity, for example, may hinder a 
patent holder’s later efforts to expand the definition of that treatment 
in future infringement suits.254 In these ways, the incentives giving rise 
to irreproducible drug patents are the product of numerous 
interrelated legal regimes: drug-development-patent policy, patent-
examination procedure, FDA policy, and the economic realities of 
preclinical testing. 
 
context of diagnostic algorithms); Roin, supra note 241, at 522–26 (describing this practice’s effect 
on patentability); Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1489, 1517–23 
(discussing the history of patents on cancer treatments). 
 249. U.S. Patent No. 8,652,776 col. 15 ll. 60–61 (filed Sept. 10, 2008). 
 250. Seymore, supra note 143, at 145–46 (“A generic claim uses structural formulas or 
functional language to cover embodiments that share a common attribute . . . and affords the 
broadest claim scope under the patent laws. . . . Indeed, a single generic claim can easily 
encompass millions, billions, or novemdecillions of compounds.” (citations omitted)). But see 
Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (rejecting this 
approach).  
 251. Lemley, supra note 13, at 117 (discussing the patentee’s strategy of “control[ling] when 
the patent issues and with what claims” in Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1172 
(E.D. Cal. 2002)).  
 252. Compare In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litigation, 583 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(noting the examiner’s objections to future evidence), with Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth 
LLC, 435 F. App’x 917, 925–26 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting the absence of objections by the 
examiner). 
 253. See Chao, supra note 14, at 1372–75 (discussing the incentives behind unclear claiming). 
 254. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1090–92 (discussing the expansion of claim language with 
time to cover after-arising technology). 
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B. Examples of Irreproducible Drug Patents 
The irreproducibility of drug patents does not occur only at the 
margins. Numerous blockbuster drugs are protected by patents 
grounded in some form of irreproducible data. Much in the same way 
that irreproducibility is a varied concept,255 the character of 
irreproducibility in drug patents is similarly varied: it can manifest in 
patents based on contradicted preclinical or clinical trials, patents 
based on irreproducible effects, patents covering a broader indication 
or target population than warranted, and patents based on such a small 
effect as to make their veracity doubtful. Prempro, Xigris, Plavix, and 
Avastin each respectively demonstrate these deficiencies. 
1. Prempro: Contradicted Data.  Perhaps the most extreme 
example of patents grounded in later-contradicted data concerns those 
related to postmenopausal hormone-replacement therapy. 
Menopause—the cessation of ovulation in women, most often due to 
age—has long been thought to bring with it several ailments, including 
bone loss, cardiovascular disease, and ovarian cancer.256 Clinicians 
attribute the onset of these illnesses, at least in part, to the decrease in 
hormone production following menopause.257 Hormone-replacement 
therapy (HRT)—small doses of hormones intended to mimic a 
premenopausal state—was consequently viewed as a logical 
treatment.258 
Beginning in the 1980s, numerous companies began to 
manufacture, market, and patent various types of HRTs as treatments 
to ameliorate menopause-related illnesses.259 Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, 
the largest HRT manufacturer,260 sold several different therapies: 
Premarin, Prempro, and Premphase.261 Unsurprisingly, Wyeth also 
 
 255. For the differences between empirical, statistical, and computational reproducibility, see 
supra Part I.A. 
 256. Millrood, supra note 101, at 42 (discussing Women’s Health Initiative Study, supra note 
101, at 321). 
 257. Id. (citing Bernardine Healy, The Mysteries of Menopause, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Nov. 18, 2002, at 39, 41). 
 258. Id. at 43 (examining the history of hormone therapy). 
 259. See id. at 42 (“In all, about 10 companies manufacture the more than two dozen hormone 
therapy products currently available.”). 
 260. See In re Pfizer, Inc., 135 F.T.C. 608, 782 (2003) (noting that, prior to acquisition, Wyeth 
was the primary HRT manufacturer). 
 261. See Ganesa Wegienka, Suzanne Havstad & Jennifer L. Kelsey, Menopausal Hormone 
Therapy in a Health Maintenance Organization Before and After Women’s Health Initiative 
Hormone Trials Termination, 15 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 369, 370–71 (2006). 
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sought to protect each of these drugs with various patents. U.S. Patent 
No. RE36,247, for example, covered Prempro,262 which claimed “[a] 
method of hormonally treating menopausal or post-menopausal 
disorders in a woman,”263 including “dosages and duration of 
treatment . . . sufficient to prevent or retard changes in blood lipids 
which might otherwise predispose the woman to cardiovascular 
disease.”264 Yet the basis for the patent’s cardiovascular claims lay in a 
single preclinical study, a study replete with the indicia of 
irreproducibility: a small sample size of only thirty subjects; an opaque 
and flexible design that did not clearly state the measurements for a 
decrease in risk of cardiovascular disease; a significant potential for 
conflict of interest, given the inventors’ original assignment of their 
patent to an investment firm; and a high quotient of competitive 
popularity with other treatments.265 Despite these concerns, Prempro’s 
annual sales topped $733 million by 2001,266 its success much indebted 
to Wyeth’s aggressive marketing of the drug’s cardiovascular benefit.267 
The rapid rise of HRTs—and questions concerning their actual 
benefits—led the NIH to support large-scale randomized trials of 
HRTs.268 One such trial, a 2002 study of various HRTs, called the 
Women’s Health Initiative Study, came to the opposite conclusion of 
Prempro’s patent and an earlier, major 1991 observational trial.269 
Rather than preventing cardiovascular disease in menopausal women, 
HRTs, including Prempro, “significantly increased the relative risk of 
coronary events by 29% among postmenopausal women.”270 A further 
follow-up randomized trial, the Heart and Estrogen–Progestin 
Replacement Study, came to a similar damning conclusion.271 The 
 
 262. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, TIME SENSITIVE PATENT 
INFORMATION PURSUANT TO 21 C.F.R. 314.53 FOR NDA 20-527, at 2 (Apr. 13, 2000), http://
www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2003/20-527S017_Prempro%20&%20Premphase_
AdminCorres_P1.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6B4-FF8W] [hereinafter PATENT INFORMATION].  
 263. U.S. Patent No. Re. 36,247 col. 10 ll. 22–23 (filed Oct. 13, 1995). 
 264. Id. col. 16 ll. 7–9. 
 265. See id. col. 7 l. 57–col. 9 l. 17 (describing this study and its follow-up). 
 266. Millrood, supra note 101, at 42 n.3. 
 267. See id. at 43 (describing Wyeth’s marketing of its drugs). 
 268. E.g., Women’s Health Initiative Study, supra note 101. 
 269. See Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 223 (discussing the Women’s Health 
Initiative Study, supra note 101, and the Nurses’ Health Study, supra note 100). 
 270. Id.; see also Women’s Health Initiative Study, supra note 101, at 321. 
 271. Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 223 (discussing Stephen Hulley et al., 
Randomized Trial of Estrogen Plus Progestin for Secondary Prevention of Coronary Heart 
Disease In Postmenopausal Women, 280 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 605, 605–13 (1998)). 
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results of these studies spawned countless lawsuits against Wyeth and 
led, ultimately, to Wyeth’s successor, Pfizer, paying $896 million in 
settlements.272 
The products-liability issues aside, this turn of events would seem 
to suggest that Prempro’s patent was never enabling in the first 
instance. The patent’s claims that certain doses of progestogen and 
estrogen could prevent cardiovascular disease were simply incorrect.273 
In that sense, a person having ordinary skill in the medical art could 
simply not “make and use” the invention.274 This conclusion seems to 
hold despite the ambiguities in the enablement doctrine concerning its 
scope: the patent’s claims lacked a corresponding enabling disclosure 
no matter whether the enablement doctrine encompassed a full-scope, 
single-embodiment, or reasonableness analysis.275 Furthermore, 
whatever the difficulties surrounding enablement’s overlap with 
inoperability, they appear neatly resolved when considering Prempro’s 
patent: because the patented method produces the opposite effect of 
what it intended, the claims ultimately required an impossible, 
“nonsensical method of operation.”276 
Yet, enablement’s focus on preapplication evidence, even in the 
face of contradictory scientific advances,277 casts this analysis into 
doubt. It is unclear whether litigants seeking to invalidate Prempro’s 
patent could have introduced such evidence. A recent district court 
lawsuit, Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Mylan Inc.,278 suggests otherwise.279 In 
Gilead, the plaintiffs sought discovery of the defendants’ Abbreviated 
New Drug Application with the FDA, to combat the defendants’ 
arguments concerning the asserted patent’s lack of enablement.280 The 
district court refused on the grounds that “everything that the Plaintiffs 
would need to defend against a claim of invalidity through enablement 
 
 272. Jef Feeley, Pfizer Paid $896 Million in Prempro Settlements, BLOOMBERG (June 19, 
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-19/pfizer-paid-896-million-in-prempro-
accords-filing-shows-1- [https://perma.cc/Z5KP-RF2B]. 
 273. See U.S. Patent No. Re. 36,247 col. 16 ll. 7–9 (filed Oct. 13, 1995). 
 274. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 275. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1088 (describing the differences in these doctrines). 
 276. See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
see also supra Part II.C (discussing the difficulties concerning enablement’s relationship with 
inoperability). 
 277. See supra Part II.A. 
 278. Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Mylan, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-99, 2015 WL 4042161 (N.D. W. Va. July 1, 
2015). 
 279. Id. at *1–2. 
 280. Id.  
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theory [was] within the four corners of the Plaintiffs’ own patent.”281 
This suggests, too, that everything the defendants needed to make their 
claim of invalidity was also limited to the four corners of the patent. 
Ultimately, Prempro’s patent was never litigated to judgment in 
federal court,282 and it quietly expired on May 2, 2006.283 
2. Xigris: Irreproducible Effects.  Not all irreproducible patents 
have contradictory indications. Others are irreproducible because 
follow-on trials are unable to reproduce the effects seen in preclinical 
or early-stage clinical trials; the underlying data is literally 
irreproducible. Xigris, a drug approved by the FDA in 2001 to treat 
sepsis284 and voluntarily withdrawn by its manufacturer Eli Lilly in 
2011,285 serves as a prime example. 
Sepsis is a general inflammatory response to an infection.286 In 
severe cases, sepsis can cause the coagulation of blood and the creation 
of circulating blood clots.287 These symptoms are often worse than the 
initial infection: coagulation and clotting from sepsis is the tenth 
leading cause of death in the United States, where it kills over a million 
people a year, or 6 percent of all recorded deaths.288 The inflammation 
pathway giving rise to sepsis is complex—isolating the proteins 
responsible still baffles scientists289—but one protein involved, 
 
 281. Id. at *2. 
 282. Intermediary owners of the Prempro patent filed only one lawsuit against two other HRT 
manufacturers, Novo Nordisk and Pharmacia & Upjohn, in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of New Jersey. That case settled by consent decree. Consent Decree and Order, Am. Home Prods. 
Corp. v. Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc., No. 3:99-cv-3162 (D.N.J.) (signed June 23, 2000), ECF No. 
24.  
 283. See PATENT INFORMATION, supra note 262, at 2. 
 284. See FDA, FDA CLINICAL REVIEW DROTRECOGIN ALFA (ACTIVATED) 1, 8  
(Nov. 21, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsare
developedandapproved/approvalapplications/therapeuticbiologicapplications/ucm113438.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S6B4-HCKS] [hereinafter FDA, DROTRECOGIN ALFA]. 
 285. Press Release, Eli Lilly & Co., Lilly Announces Withdrawal of Xigris® Following Recent 
Clinical Trial Results (Oct. 25, 2011), https://investor.lilly.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=
617602 [https://perma.cc/L5CX-6CLM]. 
 286. FDA, DROTRECOGIN ALFA, supra note 284, at 9. 
 287. Id. 
 288. See Alexander Melamed & Frank J. Sorvillo, The Burden of Sepsis-Associated Mortality 
in the United States from 1999 to 2005: An Analysis of Multiple-Cause-Of-Death Data, 13 
CRITICAL CARE, No. 1, 2009, at 1.  
 289. Charalampos Pierrakos & Jean-Louis Vincent, Sepsis Biomarkers: A Review, 14 
CRITICAL CARE, No. 15, 2010, at 1.  
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activated protein C (APC), had long been hypothesized to play a role 
in inhibiting fatal coagulation and clotting.290 
In 2001, Eli Lilly received FDA approval for a recombinant 
version of APC, marketed as Xigris, for the treatment of severe 
sepsis.291 Eli Lilly also obtained a number of patents claiming the use 
of APC to treat sepsis, including U.S. Patent Nos. 6,344,197 and 
6,489,296.292 But, having yet to complete its clinical trials for APC by 
the time the patents were filed, both patents were based on early 
preclinical data. The ’197 patent, for example, claims “[a] method of 
treating a patient suffering from sepsis” by administering a 
combination of APC and another protein, bactericidal/permeability-
increasing protein, based on the patient’s body weight.293 Given the 
patent’s description of the invention, this sounds like a promising 
treatment. Yet, the basis for the ’197 patent’s claims rests only on the 
thinnest reed of data: a preclinical, prophylactic trial in baboons—and 
even then, only ten baboons.294 As for a human trial, the patent only 
proposes a protocol for conducting one.295  
The ’296 patent similarly claims “[a] method of reducing mortality 
in a human patient with severe sepsis which comprises administering a 
dose of human activated Protein C to the patient as a continuous 
infusion.”296 But unlike the ’197 patent, the basis for the ’296 patent’s 
claims seems more robust: an actual human-subject clinical trial that 
measured the mortality rate of sepsis-suffering subjects receiving APC 
against those who did not.297 Although the sample size of the trial was 
small—only seventy-two subjects total—the results seemed strong: 
sepsis patients receiving APC died at almost half the rate of the 
patients who did not receive APC after twenty-eight days.298 In 
comparison to the ’197 patent’s data, the results predicating the ’296 
patent seemed promising. And that promise—as well as the ’197 and 
’296 patents, among others—led Eli Lilly to aggressively market Xigris. 
Eventually, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services accepted 
 
 290. FDA, DROTRECOGIN ALFA, supra note 284, at 9. 
 291. See id. at 1, 8. 
 292. U.S. Patent No. 6,489,296 (filed May 10, 2000); U.S. Patent No. 6,344,197 (filed Oct. 22, 
1999). 
 293. ’197 Patent col. 10 ll. 39–43. 
 294. Id. col. 2 ll. 19–36. 
 295. Id. col. 10 ll. 6–37. 
 296. ’296 Patent col. 15 ll. 14–17. 
 297. Id. col. 13 l. 48–col. 14 l. 49. 
 298. Id. col. 13 ll. 54–56, col. 14 ll. 4–10. 
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Xigris as “the first and only medical product to be granted new 
technology status for the substantial improvement in . . . patients with 
life-threatening severe sepsis.”299 As a result, Xigris garnered Eli Lilly 
over $100 million per year in sales.300 
This promise was not to last, however. The FDA conditioned its 
approval of Xigris on a larger follow-up study that enrolled over a 
thousand patients, rather than mere dozens.301 That study showed that 
Xigris did no better than the placebo and “was not beneficial when 
administered to a population of patients for which it was an approved 
treatment.”302 The new study, in other words, failed to reproduce the 
results of Eli Lilly’s earlier study. Faced with this irreproducible data 
and physician ire,303 Eli Lilly withdrew its drug from the FDA’s 
marketing rolls.304 
And yet, to date, the Xigris patents live on. Neither the ’197 nor 
the ’296 patent appear to have been challenged in federal court, by a 
generic competitor or otherwise. And this remains so despite the 
patents’ potential invalidity for lack of enablement. The core of both 
patents’ claims—a method of treating sepsis using APC—could not be 
reproduced in a large-scale, randomized clinical trial. This does not 
necessarily make them false. Nor does it mean that yet another trial 
could not conclude otherwise. But it does suggest that, for a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to “make and use” APC as a sepsis 
treatment, many more, and more robust, clinical trials would need to 
be conducted—a case of “undue experimentation” if there ever was 
one.305  
But the complexities in the enablement doctrine itself complicate 
this analysis. First, given the conflicting data on the efficacy of Xigris, 
 
 299. Judy Stone, Lilly’s Shocker, or the Post-Marketing Blues, SCI. AM. GUEST BLOG (Nov. 
2, 2011), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/lillys-shocker-or-the-post-marketing-
blues [https://perma.cc/4Z2E-P5M6].  
 300. Antonio Regalado, To Sell Pricey Drug, Eli Lilly Fuels a Debate over Rationing,  
WALL STREET J. (Sept. 18, 2003, 1:26 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB106382950695778600 
[https://perma.cc/YB9X-CHT9].  
 301. See Stone, supra note 299, at 1–2; see also ELI LILLY & CO., FOLLOW-UP DATA OF 
PATIENTS TREATED WITH XIGRIS® DROTRECOGIN ALFA (ACTIVATED) IN FRANCE 2 (2009), 
http://www.lillytrials.com/nonintstudies/result_files/12401.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSE2-EAMC] 
(enrolling 1049 patients). 
 302. V. Marco Ranieri et al., Drotrecogin Alfa (Activated) in Adults with Septic Shock, 366 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2055, 2063 (2012). 
 303. See Regalado, supra note 300.  
 304. Press Release, Eli Lilly & Co., supra note 285. 
 305. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.  
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it is unclear whether the patents are disenabling for the entire scope of 
their claims or just some part of them.306 Xigris may, in fact, work for 
some patients in some circumstances (although this is doubtful).307 In 
that sense, whether the Xigris patents are enabling turns on resolving 
the scope of the enablement inquiry. Furthermore, to the degree 
enablement overlaps with utility in the pharmaceutical context, it is 
unclear whether the patents truly require a prohibited “nonsensical 
method of operation,”308 or whether they merely require an 
improbable but plausible method of operation. Lastly, although the 
’197 patent appears to be based on truly paltry data, the ’296 patent is 
rooted in what appears to be a serious preclinical trial—one later 
confirmed by a larger clinical trial and only then refuted by an even 
larger clinical trial. To that end, determining whether postapplication 
evidence can be introduced to invalidate a patent for lack of 
enablement does not, in fact, resolve the enablement inquiry.309 Rather, 
it also raises questions of which postapplication evidence can be used 
at all and which is controlling. Therefore, in a greater sense, Xigris 
demonstrates the disconnect between drug development and patent 
validity: unlike Xigris, which rose and fell on the strength of the clinical 
data used to assess it, the Xigris patents appear to rise or fall on 
resolving the contours of the enablement doctrine. 
3. Plavix: Broader Indication or Target Population than 
Warranted.  Some pharmaceutical patents are irreproducible not due 
to the overall truth or falsity of their claims but for reasons having to 
do with precision: they claim a broader indication or patient population 
than the underlying data warrants. Plavix, for example, was approved 
by the FDA to reduce “atherosclerotic events,” that is, heart attacks, 
strokes, and vascular death, in patients previously diagnosed with 
atherosclerosis.310 The drug itself—clopidogrel bisulfate—acts on one 
 
 306. For a discussion of this difficulty in the enablement doctrine, see supra Part II.B. 
 307. See Ranieri et al., supra note 302, at 2062 (“The lack of benefit was consistent across 
predefined subgroups.”). 
 308. See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 309. See supra Part II.A. 
 310. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, Final Printed Labeling, in CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY AND BIOPHARMACEUTICS REVIEW, APPROVAL PACKAGE FOR PLAVIX 11,  
18 (1997), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/97/20839_Plavix_appltr_prntlbl_
medr_chemr_EA_phrmr.pdf [https://perma.cc/DCT7-HKSL]; see CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION 
AND RESEARCH, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & BIOPHARMACEUTICS REVIEW, PLAVIX 2 
(1997), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/97/20839_Plavix_clinphrmr_P1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2H7M-7325] [hereinafter FDA, PLAVIX].  
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particular protein, P2Y12, to block its role in platelet aggregation, one 
of the steps in harmful blood clotting.311 At its peak in 2011, Plavix 
generated $9.3 billion in revenue for Sanofi and Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
two pharmaceutical giants.312 And naturally, Sanofi was granted a 
patent on the method of using Plavix to “prevent[] the occurrence of a 
secondary ischemic event.”313 
Prior to Plavix exerting its effect on P2Y12, however, it must be 
metabolized into several intermediary chemicals.314 But not all patients 
metabolize Plavix similarly. Rather, up to a quarter of all Plavix 
patients fail to respond to Plavix due to differences in several genes 
responsible for drug metabolism.315 One such gene, CYP2C19, plays an 
outsized role in responsiveness to Plavix.316 Plavix patients with 
dysfunctional variants of CYP2C19 are three-and-a-half times more 
likely to experience a secondary ischemic event than patients without 
the variant.317 In other words, a large subpopulation of Plavix patients 
is entirely resistant to the treatment.318 In 2011, an enormous follow-on 
meta-analysis of 42,000 patients confirmed the importance of these 
genetic differences,319 and the FDA later required Sanofi to include this 
information on Plavix’s label.320 
 
 311. Rashmi R. Shah & Devron R. Shah, Personalized Medicine: Is It a Pharmacogenetic 
Mirage?, 74 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 698, 702 (2012). 
 312. Simon King, The Best Selling Drugs of All Time; Humira Joins The Elite, FORBES  
(Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/simonking/2013/01/28/the-best-selling-drugs-of-all-
time-humira-joins-the-elite [https://perma.cc/X9VV-3Z3E].  
 313. U.S. Patent No. 5,576,328 col. 6 ll. 60–61 (filed Jan. 31, 1994). 
 314. Shah & Shah, supra note 311, at 702 (“Clopidogrel is pharmacologically inactive and 
requires activation to its pharmacologically active thiol metabolite that binds irreversibly to the 
P2Y12 receptors on platelets.”). 
 315. See Jean-Sébastien Hulot et al., Cytochrome P450 2C19 Loss-of-Function Polymorphism 
Is a Major Determinant of Clopidogrel Responsiveness in Healthy Subjects, 108 BLOOD 2244, 2244 
(2006) (“The pharmacodynamic response to clopidogrel varies widely from subject to subject, and 
about 25% of patients treated with standard clopidogrel doses display low ex vivo inhibition of 
ADP-induced platelet aggregation. . . . [C]ertain genetic factors may be involved in this 
phenomenon.”). 
 316. Id. 
 317. Shah & Shah, supra note 311, at 702–03. 
 318. See Hulot et al., supra note 315, at 2244. 
 319. See Michael V. Holmes et al., CYP2C19 Genotype, Clopidogrel Metabolism, Platelet 
Function, and Cardiovascular Events: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, 306 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 2704, 2704 (2011). 
 320. FDA Updates Plavix Label with PGx Data, but Does Not Provide Dosing 
Recommendations, GENOMEWEB (June 17, 2009), https://www.genomeweb.com/dxpgx/fda-
updates-plavix-label-pgx-data-does-not-provide-dosing-recommendations [https://perma.cc/VF
Y4-MYKC].  
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But the FDA did not require, or even suggest, that Sanofi correct 
its underlying patents.321 To the contrary, Sanofi’s Plavix method-of-
use patent makes no mention of CYP2C19 or even the possibility that 
genetic differences among patients may play a role in its 
effectiveness.322 This overly broad view of Plavix’s efficacy—one that 
fails to acknowledge that the treatment will fail in up to a quarter of 
patients—calls the enablement of the patent into question. The 
patent’s claims, directed to “[a] method for preventing the occurrence 
of a secondary ischemic event [by] administering to a patient . . . a 
therapeutically effective amount of [Plavix],”323 do not limit themselves 
to patients with functioning metabolisms of Plavix. For patients with 
such metabolic deficiencies, there is no “therapeutically effective 
amount”324 of the drug. In terms of enablement, a physician treating a 
patient with such a deficiency cannot—by virtue of biology—“make 
[or] use” the patented invention.325 
But again, whether this invalidates the patent seems to turn less 
on genetics and more on defining the contours of enablement. To the 
degree that enablement requires a person having ordinary skill in the 
art to work every limitation of the patent’s claims,326 it seems clear that 
the Plavix method-of-use patent is invalid. But for three-quarters of the 
patient populace, the invention is invaluable, “a drug of ‘major 
historical significance.’”327 Under a reasonableness or even a single-
embodiment interpretation of enablement,328 therefore, the Plavix 
method-of-use patent seems enabling, beyond dispute. 
Even with the contours of enablement resolved, there remains the 
thornier issue of how to treat the scientific advances concerning 
genotyping and genetic sequencing in relation to an older patent. The 
Plavix method-of-use patent was filed in 1994,329 when genetic 
 
 321. For a discussion concerning the FDA’s role, or lack thereof, in policing drug patents, see 
Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 214–16 (2015). 
 322. See U.S. Patent No. 5,576,328 (filed Jan. 31, 1994). 
 323. Id. col. 6 ll. 60–63. 
 324. Id. col. 6 ll. 62–63. 
 325. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 326. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1088 & nn.19–21 (describing the full-scope doctrine). 
 327. Michael O’Riordan, So Long, Plavix, What a Ride! Clopidogrel Patent Expires, 
MEDSCAPE: HEARTWIRE (May 17, 2012), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/764052 [https://
perma.cc/Y6ES-SAT8].  
 328. See supra notes 197–204 and accompanying text. 
 329. See U.S. Patent No. 5,576,328 (filed Jan. 31, 1994). 
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sequencing was in a relative infancy.330 It was therefore unlikely, if not 
impossible, for the inventor to have been able to assess genetic 
differences among potential Plavix patients contributing to the drug’s 
efficacy—or lack thereof. In this sense, fixing the enablement inquiry 
at the time the patent was filed seems to produce one outcome—
validity—whereas future advances produce another—invalidity.331 
Lastly, the Plavix patent demonstrates just how confusing 
enablement’s entanglement with the inoperability doctrine can be. For 
normal patients, the invention described in the Plavix patent has a well-
defined use—the reduction of secondary ischemic events. But for 
patients with a CYP2C19 deficiency, the invention is simply useless—
it borders, in the words of the Process Control court, on a “nonsensical 
method of operation.”332 Although inoperability seems to take hold 
only when all embodiments of a patent invention are facially 
inoperable, it is unclear how the doctrine works—and how it relates to 
enablement—where an invention is facially inoperable, but only to 
some users. Plavix accordingly highlights the difficulties in aligning 
precision medicine with precision claiming. 
4. Avastin: Small Effect Size.  Yet other drug patents seem likely 
to be irreproducible due to small effect size—that even assuming a 
statistically significant difference between the drug and a placebo, the 
benefit of the drug is so small as to make the result doubtful.333 This is, 
in fact, a frequent problem with cancer drugs, where the effect size of 
overall patient survival is often measured in only one or two months.334 
Such small effects often cast doubt on whether the original clinical 
trials supporting cancer drugs’ approval are reproducible.335 And they 
also cast doubt on patent claims predicated on using such drugs to treat 
cancer. 
Avastin—a monoclonal antibody manufactured by Roche—was 
first approved by the FDA in 2004 to treat metastatic colorectal 
 
 330. See ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, THE GENE WARS: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE HUMAN 
GENOME 56–77 (1994) (discussing the history of genetic sequencing). 
 331. See Lemley, supra note 13, at 106–07 (discussing fixing the meaning of claim terms, and 
consequently enablement, at the time the patent was filed).  
 332. Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 333. See Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 697–98 (discussing small effect size and 
reproducibility).  
 334. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text.  
 335. See Light & Lexchin, supra note 9, at h2068 (discussing the incremental benefit of many 
approved cancer drugs). 
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cancer.336 The drug was later proven successful—and approved by the 
FDA—to treat several other cancers, including lung, kidney, brain, and 
breast cancer.337 But its efficacy in treating breast cancer was 
notoriously small. Tested as a combination therapy with another breast 
cancer drug, paclitaxel—a typical procedure for cancer clinical trials—
Avastin improved overall patient survival by a mere 1.7 months.338 
Nonetheless, the FDA approved Avastin for metastatic breast cancer 
in 2008, although on the condition that Roche conduct two additional 
follow-on trials.339 
This insignificant increase in overall survival led several clinicians 
to question the reproducibility of the drug’s efficacy in treating breast 
cancer. Immediately following approval, the New York Times ran a 
front-page story noting that “the drug prolongs life by only a few 
months, if that.”340 One clinician called the results “sobering.”341 A 2009 
editorial on Avastin described its efficacy in breast cancer as “probably 
nonexistent, even if measured in days.”342 A 2010 review of several 
small-effect cancer therapies criticized Avastin as providing only 
“marginal benefits . . . after it was shown to ‘prolong’ [overall survival] 
by a statistically insignificant 1.7 months.”343 And David Gorski, a 
clinical oncologist and editor of the blog Science-Based Medicine, 
called the approval results “thin gruel.”344  
Two later follow-on trials of Avastin in breast cancer proved these 
doubts well-founded. One trial concluded that Avastin decreased 
patient overall survival by 1.1 to 1.7 months; another found that 
Avastin increased overall survival but only by 2.9 months.345 This 
conflicting data—and some additional evidence that Avastin was 
 
 336. FDA, FDA BRIEFING DOCUMENT: ONCOLOGY DRUG ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
MEETING 7 (2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeeting
Materials/Drugs/OncologicDrugsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM219224.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ3P-
XVF4] [hereinafter FDA, AVASTIN].  
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 27. 
 339. Id. at 9, 27. 
 340. Gina Kolata & Andrew Pollack, In Costly Cancer Drug, Hope and a Dilemma, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 6, 2008, at A1.  
 341. Id. 
 342. Fojo & Grady, supra note 21, at 1045. 
 343. Fojo & Parkinson, supra note 21, at 5973. 
 344. David Gorski, Avastin and Metastatic Breast Cancer: When Science-Based Medicine 
Collides with FDA Regulation, SCI.-BASED MED. (Aug. 30, 2010), https://www.sciencebased
medicine.org/avastin-and-metastatic-breast-cancer-when-science-based-medicine-collides-with-
fda-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/D3CM-LQ3S]. 
 345. FDA, AVASTIN, supra note 336, at 27. 
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causing unwanted side effects—eventually caused the FDA to pull 
approval for Avastin as a treatment of metastatic breast cancer.346 
Despite all of this, patents on Avastin as a “method of treating 
breast cancer” abound.347 For example, U.S. Patent No. 8,017,735, 
owned by Merck & Co., claims “[a] method for treating [breast] 
cancer”348 by using Avastin as a combination therapy with another 
antibody.349 U.S. Patent No. 8,859,542, originally assigned to Wyeth 
Pharmaceuticals, similarly claims “[a] method of treating [breast] 
cancer”350 by administering Avastin in conjunction with a triazine 
derivative.351 And U.S. Patent No. 9,066,963 claims “[a] method of 
treating breast cancer in a subject in need thereof”352 by using Avastin 
with anthracycline.353  
Whether such inventions are indeed cancer treatments, as they 
claim, likely turns on what constitutes a “treatment.”354 Yet, where the 
relative effect size of the treatment is so small as to likely be 
irreproducible—as it was with Avastin—it seems specious to allow 
patents to claim a drug as a “method of treatment”; it is highly doubtful 
that the patented drug actually treats the indicated disease. Because a 
person having ordinary skill in the art would need to engage in undue 
experimentation to determine whether the claimed therapy constitutes 
a “method of treating cancer,”355 cancer treatment patents of this kind 
are likely invalid for lacking enablement. Such patents are similar to 
the patent at issue in In re ’318 Patent,356 where the cited references 
concerning a treatment for Alzheimer’s was a “mere research 
proposal.”357 Indeed, cancer-treatment patents—like cures for 
 
 346. Press Release, FDA, FDA Commissioner Announces Avastin Decision: Drug Not 
Shown to Be Safe and Effective in Breast Cancer Patients (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm280536.htm [https://perma.cc/NYX8-5UDM]. 
 347. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,066,963 col. 289 ll. 20–21 (filed Mar. 15, 2012). 
 348. U.S. Patent No. 8,017,735 col. 89 l. 51 (filed Nov. 19, 2004).  
 349. Id. col. 95 l. 28. 
 350. U.S. Patent No. 8,859,542 col. 223 l. 25 (filed Apr. 23, 2014). 
 351. Id. col. 1, l. 25, col. 228 l. 26. 
 352. ’963 Patent col. 289 ll. 20–21.  
 353. Id. col. 290, ll. 20, 31–31. 
 354. Because the definition of medical treatments could be broad, generally—including 
interventions that provide little, if any, therapeutic benefit—definitions of cancer treatments may 
similarly be broadened beyond mere issues of therapeutic efficacy. Cf. Fojo & Grady, supra note 
21, at 1047 (“Ultimately, however, what counts as a benefit in cancer treatment and how much 
cost should factor into deliberations are not ethical problems that can be relegated to others.”).  
 355. See supra notes 134–36, 142–52 and accompanying text. 
 356. In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 357. See id. at 1324, 1327.  
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baldness—have been specifically spotlighted by the Federal Circuit as 
a “notoriously intractable area[]” to prove enablement.358 
Interestingly, however, this analysis seems to hold despite the 
ambiguities in enablement doctrine. The skepticism surrounding small 
effect sizes for therapies in complex diseases is independent of whether 
enablement is assessed according to the full scope of the contested 
patent’s claims or only a single embodiment of them.359 A method of 
treating cancer dubious at the time of filing is likely to continue being 
dubious until proven otherwise. Similarly, the difficulties concerning 
replicating studies with small effect sizes are apparent at the time of 
filing—as demonstrated by clinicians’ concern with Avastin as a breast 
cancer therapy before the results of the FDA’s mandated follow-on 
studies.360 To that extent, resolving questions of whether 
postapplication evidence or new scientific advances are allowed to 
prove a lack of enablement becomes less important.361 And lastly, the 
confusing overlap between enablement and lack of utility362 becomes 
less confusing where the treatment in question appears, in some senses, 
useless. As with Avastin, clinicians—and the PTO—are right to ask, 
“What is the minimum amount of benefit needed to adopt a therapy as 
the new standard? Is 1.2 months of additional life a ‘good’ in itself?”363 
C. The Social Costs of Irreproducible Drug Patents 
The regulatory history of Prempro, Xigris, Plavix, and Avastin—
all drugs once approved and later withdrawn—would suggest a self-
correcting mechanism at work: The FDA appears to eventually catch 
drugs grounded in truly irreproducible data, and demands their 
discontinuance to the financial detriment of their manufacturers. Drug 
manufacturers become wary about developing—and, consequently, 
patenting—irreproducible drugs. And once drugs are removed from 
the market at the request of the FDA, the patents covering such drugs 
become worthless because the products that they cover cannot be 
legally sold. 
 
 358. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435 F. App’x 917, 924 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(requiring “special procedures . . . for subject matter in once notoriously intractable areas such as 
cures for baldness or cancer”). 
 359. For a discussion of these doctrines, see supra Part II.B. 
 360. See supra notes 340–44 and accompanying text. 
 361. See supra Part II.A. 
 362. See supra Part II.C. 
 363. Fojo & Grady, supra note 21, at 1045. 
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To the contrary. The proliferation of drug patents grounded in 
irreproducible data brings with it numerous social costs affecting drug 
research, scientific integrity, and patient safety. The incentives giving 
rise to irreproducible patents may have the most startling effect on 
drug development and research. A recent study by Eric Budish, 
Benjamin Roin, and Heidi Williams empirically assesses the effects of 
easy early patenting when combined with the pressures of FDA 
approval and market races.364 By examining data concerning cancer 
clinical trials and firm investment, the authors conclude that “private 
firms may invest more in late-stage cancer drugs—and too little in early-
stage cancer and cancer prevention drugs—because late-stage cancer 
drugs can be brought to market comparatively quickly, whereas drugs 
to treat early-stage cancer and to prevent cancer require a much longer 
time to bring to market.”365  
One of the drivers behind this underinvestment in early-stage 
treatment and prevention surrounds the “structure of the patent 
system”366: by requiring the patenting of drugs before substantial 
clinical trials have been conducted—that is, by encouraging 
irreproducible patents as a condition of economic success—the patent 
system has encouraged drug developers to focus on treatments that 
maximize patent life span.367 This has meant, according to Budish, 
Roin, and Williams’s data, that private drug developers have 
practically ignored a core measure of reproducibility in their research: 
the long-term survival of patients. In fact, there is a negative correlation 
between the percentage of privately sponsored clinical trials and the 
five-year survival rate of patients enrolled in those trials.368 And as for 
development projects that last longer than the patent term—twenty 
years—“essentially 100 percent are publicly funded.”369 The incentives 
of private cancer drug development in the United States, therefore, are 
to obtain patents quickly on relatively thin data, which can then be used 
to expedite drug approval on short-term clinical measurements: a 
recipe for irreproducibility.370 The cost of this “corporate short-
 
 364. Budish et al., supra note 8, at 2045–46. 
 365. Id. at 2045.  
 366. Id. 
 367. See id. at 2074–75. 
 368. Id. at 2075 fig.5. 
 369. Id. at 2074. 
 370. See id. at 2047–49 (discussing some of the perverse incentives in allowing firms to utilize 
surrogate endpoints). 
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termism” is astronomical: “890,000 lost life-years . . . [valued] on the 
order of $89 billion.”371 
Research incentives—and their failures—aside, irreproducible 
patents also seem to contribute to the opacity of clinical trial data. 
Besides data obtained from clinical trials themselves, applicants for 
new drugs must report to the FDA “any other data or information 
relevant to an evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the drug 
product,” including the same preclinical data that are often the subject 
of a drug’s patents.372 This discourages applicants from producing—and 
disclosing in patent applications—robust and potentially invalidating 
preclinical data. This occurs widely in the diagnostics field, where light 
regulation has coincided with a recent gold rush to patent basic 
materials and methods of the art.373 Approval is easy,374 the underlying 
data may be kept confidential,375 patents are valuable,376 and robust 
assessments of reproducibility are scant.377 This all “creates some 
unique points of conflict, with consequences for the integrity of the 
scientific field and for the quality of patient services.”378 
Similarly, the existence of irreproducible patents further 
discourages the creation or sharing of clinical information after FDA 
approval. Patents protecting a new, approved drug are entitled to a 
presumption of validity, as with all other patents.379 This presumption 
means that even baldly irreproducible patents require no further proof 
of their validity—no follow-on studies as a condition of their issuance. 
Nonetheless, because postapplication data can be used to invalidate 
patents in some circumstances,380 drug developers have little incentive 
 
 371. Id. at 2049. 
 372. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv) (2016).  
 373. Kane, supra note 248, at 838. 
 374. See Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of Personalized 
Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1889–93 (2016) (discussing the lack of regulation 
surrounding many diagnostic tests). 
 375. ILLUMINA INC., MISEQDX CYSTIC FIBROSIS SYSTEM: PREMARKET NOTIFICATION, 
510(K) SUMMARY (2013), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf12/K124006.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LUS7-RVDD] (marking approval information for the drug MiSeqDx as confidential). 
 376. See Sherkow & Scott, supra note 83, at 260 (discussing the value of diagnostic patents). 
 377. Lau, Ioannidis & Schmid, supra note 9, at 123 (noting that “[t]he number [of meta-
analyses] is small compared with the estimate of half a million randomised controlled trials”).  
 378. Kane, supra note 248, at 838. 
 379. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435 F. App’x 917, 923–26 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (concluding that Eli Lilly’s 
patent satisfied the enablement requirement even though the defendant raised doubts about the 
studies included in the patent’s specification). 
 380. See supra notes 142–62 and accompanying text. 
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to engage in follow-on studies in the fear of uncovering harmful data 
that may cast their patents—or, worse, their FDA approvals—into 
doubt.381 Thus, for fear of putting patents into jeopardy, drug 
manufacturers are encouraged to deprive the medical community of 
the very sort of information that may elucidate whether the benefits of 
a particular treatment are, or are not, reproducible. 
In addition, irreproducible patents may affect competitors’ 
development programs by discouraging research into and development 
of alternative uses of known drugs. Because patents on new drugs can 
be obtained even with sketchy efficacy data,382 drug developers who 
receive composition patents on new drugs have a de facto monopoly 
on all marketable uses of the drug until the original composition patent 
expires: competitors cannot sell the same drug for a different 
indication—even if they were the first to run clinical trials for that 
indication—without receiving a patent license.383 More pragmatically, 
all drug developers, focused on short-term goals with limited research 
budgets, have little incentive to even begin research into alternative 
uses of known, patented compounds until after those compounds’ 
primary patents expire384—even if they suspect that the drug’s efficacy 
data is likely irreproducible. 
Finally, irreproducible patents risk becoming weaponized by 
aggressive patent holders seeking to quash competition in related 
areas. Patents claiming new effects of old technologies—such as new 
indications for an old drug—can potentially be used to enjoin 
competitors from the manufacture or sale of the older pharmaceutical, 
even if the new indications later turn out to be ineffective.385 This has 
recently become an issue in the nutritional supplement industry for 
 
 381. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 370 (“[T]rial sponsors stand to lose revenue if trials 
indicate that their products are unsafe or ineffective for certain indications. Indeed, from the 
perspective of the manufacturer, rigorous clinical trials of off-label uses may be as likely to 
diminish the value of a particular product as to enhance it.”). 
 382. See supra Parts I.C & III.B. 
 383. W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 525 (2014) (“Composition patents are more 
valuable because a patent on the drug’s active ingredient allows the patentee to exclude others 
from making, selling, or using the drug for any use, even those uses not specifically envisioned by 
the patentee.”). 
 384. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 370; Laakmann, supra note 25, at 157–58.  
 385. See, e.g., In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 526–28 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(allowing the patentee to assert claims covering virtually all statins, even though the evidence 
suggested that only a single species was effective); Cancer Research Tech. Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 
625 F.3d 724, 734 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (allowing the patentee to assert claims against a competitor 
even though it withheld negative clinical study data from the PTO). 
SHERKOW IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2017  11:59 AM 
902  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:845 
patents held by Thermolife International, a nutritional supplement 
manufacturer. Research in the early 1990s by former Stanford 
professor John P. Cooke suggested that an amino acid, L-arginine, may 
increase the natural production of one chemical in the blood, nitric 
oxide, which had been thought to improve exercise performance.386 
After obtaining patents on this use of L-arginine, however, follow-on 
research significantly discounted the effect.387 Nonetheless, Thermolife 
then purchased the patents from Stanford and began to assert them 
against competitors selling products merely containing L-arginine—an 
integral component of virtually all protein powders.388 Thus, although 
other supplement manufacturers had been selling L-arginine-
containing products for years, and although follow-on research 
demonstrated that the effect on nitric-oxide production described in 
the patent was not effective, Thermolife has been able to use these 
irreproducible patents to wreak havoc through the nutritional 
supplement industry.389 
IV.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IRREPRODUCIBILITY TO PATENT LAW 
The widespread existence of irreproducible patents—in an area of 
technology often held as an exemplar of the patent system—shows a 
broad disconnect between scientific advancement and innovation 
policy. Unlike peer review, scientific reputation, or grant funding, 
patents do little to serve as verifiers of truth despite various 
requirements concerning the disclosure or workability of claimed 
inventions. Although this disconnect has broad significance for 
innovation policy, this Article’s findings also have significance for 
doctrinal patent law.  
In particular, this Article illuminates, and potentially resolves, 
several scholarly debates concerning the role and limits of patents as 
 
 386. See U.S. Patent No. 5,891,459 (filed Nov. 9, 1995); John P. Cooke et al., Arginine Restores 
Cholinergic Relaxation of Hypercholesterolemic Rabbit Thoracic Aorta, 83 CIRCULATION 1057, 
1058–61 (1991).  
 387. Andrew M. Wilson, Randall Harada, Nandini Nair, Naras Balasubramanian & John P. 
Cooke, L-Arginine Supplementation in Peripheral Arterial Disease: No Benefit and Possible Harm, 
116 CIRCULATION 188, 188 (2007). 
 388. Data from LexMachina (www.lexmachina.com) show that, as of July 1, 2016, Thermolife 
has sued at least fifty-four other entities for infringing this and related patents (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal).  
 389. See Planet Money: The Muscle Patents, NPR (June 10, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=481597112 [https://perma.cc/T2
HR-KJCJ] (describing the background of Thermolife’s lawsuits).  
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collections of scientific information. First, this Article’s findings are 
informative about the limited role of patents as vehicles of scientific 
disclosure—a hotly debated topic in current scholarship. The 
presence—and continued validity—of patents grounded in 
irreproducible data demonstrates that patents are poor conduits of up-
to-date, workable, practical disclosures of scientific information. 
Second, this Article elucidates the difference between the doctrines of 
utility and enablement: utility concerns whether a patent’s claims are 
possible; enablement concerns whether a patent’s claims are probable. 
And lastly, this Article suggests a resolution to the continuing problem 
of whether, and to what extent, enablement should incorporate after-
arising evidence: in short, it should. Evidence suggesting that the public 
could not benefit from a patent’s disclosures shows that the patentee 
did not fulfill patent law’s quid pro quo—and equally so if the evidence 
comes before or after the inventor’s patent application.  
A. Irreproducibility and the Limits of Disclosure 
Among patent law scholars, there is a robust, recent debate 
concerning the nature and scope of patent law’s disclosure 
requirement.390 There appears to be broad consensus that the 
disclosure requirement, as it is currently structured, does little to 
inform scientists about critical advances in technology. Jason Rantanen 
recently compiled academic criticism against this teaching function of 
patents: “useless,” “incomplete and opaque,” and blind.391 Jeanne C. 
Fromer also summarized the “good deal of [empirical] 
evidence . . . that technologists do not find that [patents] contain[] 
pertinent information for their research.”392 Inventors do not read one 
another’s patents, scientists do not cite them in their papers, and 
patentees do not turn to patents for inspiration.393 And Timothy R. 
Holbrook noted that the value of truly cutting-edge information makes 
patents’ supposed “[teaching] function . . . in tension, if not antithetical, 
to the incentive theory of patent law.”394 
And yet, many scholars have still lauded the disclosure 
requirement as an important tool in “bridg[ing] the gap between patent 
 
 390. See supra note 129. 
 391. Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012).  
 392. Fromer, supra note 129, at 560. 
 393. Id. at 560–61. 
 394. Holbrook, supra note 129, at 133.  
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law and the norms of science.”395 Sean B. Seymore has proposed 
several benefits of patents as repositories of scientific information: 
patents are free, in comparison to expensive academic journals; they 
are automatically published eighteen months after they are filed; and 
they serve as outlets for technical information when others are not 
available.396 And Dmitry Karshtedt has noted that patents may serve 
as signals of other, more useful information, “such as academic 
publications and sales of products embodying patented inventions.”397 
Alan Devlin has touted disclosure as simply being better than the 
alternative: secrecy.398 
But few have noted the difficulties concerning disclosure with 
respect to reproducibility.399 Because patents are static documents, 
they are poorly equipped to incorporate future findings that cast doubt 
on their applicability. In the interim, they remain fixed (and 
enforceable) for twenty years from the date which they were filed—
eons in certain fast-moving fields, like computer science. As a 
consequence, innovators looking for truly informative, technical 
disclosures in patents may, in many cases, be relying on information 
that is either out of date or incorrect. And even in cases where patents 
do disclose technical information rapidly, there may be various signs 
that the data grounding a patent are likely to be irreproducible in the 
future.400 The hardest cases, of course, concern patent disclosures that 
appear to be enabling, but later turn out not to be.401 
These cases—ubiquitous in pharmaceutical patents—strongly 
counsel against thinking of the disclosure requirement as possessing a 
teaching function or aligning scientific and legal norms. Patents may 
 
 395. E.g., Seymore, supra note 29, at 656. 
 396. Id. at 656–57. 
 397. Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 949, 
1016 n.397 (2015). 
 398. Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 401, 417–18 (2010). Delvin notes:  
[P]atent laws likely were not designed to appeal to the inventors of concealable 
technology, for whom trade secret is the avenue of greatest allure. . . . [T]he 
contemporary patent system with its many disclosure conditions would remain unused. 
Society would be deprived of an understanding of [secret] invention[s] regardless of 
the patent system’s existence.  
Id.  
 399. Dmitry Karshtedt is one of the few who has tied together difficulties in the disclosure 
requirement with reproducibility concerns, albeit in a few narrow cases concerning biotechnology. 
See Karshtedt, supra note 4, at 110–11. 
 400. Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 218, 222. 
 401. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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very well appear to teach others in the field useful information but in 
fact—and not until long after the patent has issued—not teach anything 
at all. This view runs counter to some recent scholarship suggesting that 
the failings of the disclosure function could be solved by making it 
more robust, by, for example, requiring working examples from patent 
applicants.402 Therapies directed to long-term cancer treatments cannot 
practically be subject to working examples during patent prosecution. 
And yet, it is precisely such patents that are both financially valuable 
and subject to charges of irreproducibility. Making the disclosure 
doctrine more robust in such circumstances would do little to bridge 
the gap between science and law. 
This limited view of disclosure dovetails with recent work 
concerning the costs and benefits of a dysfunctional disclosure regime. 
Fromer, for example, has demonstrated just how “disclosure norms 
and rules are lax.”403 This, Fromer argues, makes it costly for the public 
to enforce a more robust disclosure requirement and gives innovation 
policymakers “good reason to place the costs of adequate 
informational disclosure on the patent applicant rather than on the 
public (or the government), to which a greater portion of it is now 
relegated.”404 The same is of course true for inventions of suspect 
reproducibility. The disclosure norms in the pharmaceutical context 
are substantially lax as compared to the regulatory work required to 
bring products to market. But heightening reproducibility 
requirements at the PTO by requiring more robust preclinical data may 
not be worth the candle in light of subsequent regulatory delay. 
As a consequence, patents that disclose irreproducible data 
suggest only the narrowest of teaching functions, if they have one at all. 
Even under the best circumstances—drugs, like Prempro, that have 
gone through robust clinical trials, only to have more robust clinical 
trials undermine their efficacy—it is unclear what was gained from the 
disclosures in the patent document. 
 
 402. E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 214–16; Fiona E. Murray, Joshua S. Gans & Mackey 
L. Craven, How Does the Republic of Science Shape the Patent System? Broadening the 
Institutional Analysis of Innovation Beyond Patents, 1 U.C. IRV. L. REV. 357, 360 (2011); Seymore, 
supra note 29, at 654–56. 
 403. Fromer, supra note 129, at 596. 
 404. Id. 
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B. Irreproducibility and Utility 
Like the Federal Circuit in Eli Lilly, scholars have traditionally 
linked utility and enablement.405 Dan L. Burk and Lemley, for 
example, famously described the connection in 2004: “[T]he definition 
of enablement affects the patentability requirement of specific utility, 
as the invention must operate as described in the specification if the 
inventor is to enable one of ordinary skill to use it.”406 At the same time, 
little scholarly attention has been focused on qualifying which doctrine 
should apply depending upon how many embodiments of an invention 
may make its patent’s claims inoperative. This has resulted in at least 
some of the confusion in how to appropriately assess patents claiming 
broad genuses of their technologies,407 after-arising embodiments,408 or 
cases where “some members of [embodiments] x have utility, and some 
do not.”409 
This Article’s recognition that irreproducibility may render some 
patent claims useful but not enabling suggests one avenue of relief: the 
overlap between utility and enablement only appears meaningful 
where no embodiments of the claims are workable.410 By contrast, 
because of the varied nature of irreproducibility,411 patents grounded 
in irreproducible data do not necessarily fail in all cases—and as a 
consequence, the two doctrines appear to work independently. Indeed, 
utility only appears to serve as a proxy for enablement when follow-on 
studies produce contradictory results.412 When future studies are 
simply unable to replicate prior results,413 or produce effect sizes 
 
 405. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of 
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1164 n.78 (2008); Seymore, supra note 210, at 1068 
(“Under current law, an invention which lacks utility under § 101 also fails as a matter of law to 
comply with the enablement requirement of § 112(a).”). 
 406. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 691, 709 (2004). 
 407. See Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 102 
(2011) (“The difficult question is determining whether the specification has enabled the broad 
genus.”). 
 408. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1098–1105. 
 409. Lefstin, supra note 405, at 1164 n.78. 
 410. See supra notes 227–34 and accompanying text. 
 411. For a demonstration of the heterogeneity of irreproducibility in pharmaceuticals, see 
supra Part III.B. 
 412. For a discussion of Prempro, see supra Part III.B.1. 
 413. See Drummond, supra note 4, at 2. For a discussion of Xigris, see supra Part III.B.2. 
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smaller or larger than those determined originally,414 this does not 
mean that inventions based on earlier studies fail as a matter of course. 
Put more pithily, one way to recognize the difference between utility 
and enablement is this: utility concerns possibility; enablement 
concerns probability. 
This understanding should also be useful for courts addressing 
similar questions concerning reproducibility. A patent with claims 
drawn to several irreproducible—and disenabling—embodiments but 
with a single enabling embodiment still possesses utility; the patent has 
a use for persons having ordinary skill in the patent’s art. Invalidating 
such a patent on utility grounds would consequently be wrong as a 
matter of doctrine.415 Nor would it fulfill the purpose of the utility 
requirement to prohibit the patenting of trivial or useless inventions.416 
The doctrine of enablement, rather—the doctrine concerning the 
strength and accuracy of the patent’s disclosure—seems much better 
suited to the task of invalidating patents claiming multiple 
irreproducible embodiments. Courts looking to utility to resolve 
questions of irreproducibility rather than enablement therefore have 
the potential to hamstring themselves by only invalidating impossible 
or contradictory patents. Clearly differentiating the two doctrines 
would provide courts a single, clear avenue to assess claims of 
disenabling irreproducibility. 
C. Irreproducibility and After-Arising Evidence 
Lastly, the nature of irreproducible patents also strongly favors 
current scholarly—and judicial—trends calling for the introduction of 
postapplication evidence to prove a lack of enablement.417 As 
highlighted by In re ’318 Patent and Eli Lilly, enablement sets no clear 
rules for when postapplication evidence can be introduced to 
challenge—or support—a patent’s validity.418 This is problematic for 
 
 414. See Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 222 (describing different effect sizes 
in follow-on clinical studies). For a discussion of using Avastin to treat breast cancer, see supra 
Part III.B.4. 
 415. See Seymore, supra note 210, at 1048 (“A low utility threshold aligns with the broad 
policy goals of the patent system.”). 
 416. See id. at 1075–76. 
 417. See supra Part II.A. 
 418. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435 F. App’x 917, 925–26 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(allowing future evidence to satisfy enablement); In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 
1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (disallowing postapplication evidence to satisfy enablement); see also 
supra Part II.A. 
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patents based on irreproducible data because the nature of 
irreproducibility is post hoc: whether a study is or is not reproducible 
can only be determined after the original study has been completed.419  
This has several normative advantages. Allowing postapplication 
evidence in enablement assessments would therefore strongly 
discourage patents fixed in irreproducible data. Patentees faced with 
the choice of filing early applications based on skimpy—and likely 
irreproducible—data, or waiting to perfect their applications with 
more robust data, should, all else equal, choose the latter. Patent 
applicants without such options may consider narrowing their claims to 
better encompass the certainty—or lack thereof—of their inventions. 
And challengers of putatively invalid patents would be encouraged to 
spend litigation resources demonstrating the irreproducibility of the 
patents asserted against them—a rare example of litigation strategy 
and scientific advancement aligning. In any of these cases, opening 
patent challenges to postapplication evidence weeds irreproducible 
data from the greater patent landscape. 
As indicated by the diverging opinions in In re ’318 Patent and Eli 
Lilly, the role of postapplication evidence in enablement challenges is 
governed judicially.420 And there is nothing in the enablement statute 
to suggest that postapplication evidence should never be considered in 
raising questions of enablement.421 The Federal Circuit should 
therefore explicitly permit the introduction of postapplication 
evidence to challenge irreproducible patents’ lack of enablement—
with several boundaries.  
First, a long line of enablement precedent has defined the doctrine 
as whether a person having ordinary skill in the art could have made 
and used the invention without undue experimentation at the time of 
the patent application.422 Accordingly, the ultimate inquiry for whether 
postapplication evidence proves the invalidity of an issued patent 
should be worded as whether the postapplication evidence 
demonstrates that a person having ordinary skill in the art could not 
have made or used the invention at the time of the patent application. 
 
 419. See Stodden, supra note 4, at 1 (“A fundamental goal of statistics is to ensure the 
reproducibility of scientific findings. . . . If discoveries are made, it is of great interest to 
understand whether these findings persist in different samples . . . . The persistence of findings 
across different samples is the basis upon which scientific claims are evaluated.”). 
 420. See Eli Lilly, 435 F. App’x at 925–26; In re ’318 Patent, 583 F.3d at 1327. 
 421. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 422. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1098–1105 (discussing these cases); see also Lemley, supra 
note 13, at 106–07 (discussing this in the context of claim interpretation). 
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This standard seems squarely in line with the enablement statute. 
Currently codified at 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), it makes no mention of when 
enablement evidence must have been published or created, or even 
when the enablement inquiry arises. It requires only that the 
specification enable others to “make and use” the invention.423 Further, 
allowing postapplication evidence to assess enablement traces the basic 
contours of a scientific understanding of irreproducibility, an inquiry 
typically focused on whether an original study was, in fact, true to begin 
with.424 
Second, the introduction of postapplication evidence to combat 
enablement should not turn on whether the issue was raised by the 
patent examiner during prosecution, in contravention of Eli Lilly.425 
Patent prosecution is, in many senses, “an ongoing negotiation 
between the PTO and the applicant.”426 Formal challenges by the 
examiner to the apparent irreproducibility of a patent application’s 
claims therefore likely turn on the content of negotiations—or lack 
thereof—between an applicant and the PTO. Such challenges may also 
reflect the drafting skill of the patent attorney or the whim of the 
examiner, rather than the level of irreproducibility of the patent 
application’s source data. Future challengers to issued patents should 
not be precluded from raising similar issues simply because the 
examiner was slack.427 
Third, postapplication evidence should not be limited to only 
“notoriously intractable areas such as cures for baldness or cancer.”428 
Other areas of scientific inquiry—and patenting—similarly suffer from 
irreproducible data, such as genetic testing,429 antibody research,430 and 
 
 423. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). The statute states: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner 
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same . . . . 
Id. 
 424. See Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 696 (describing reproducibility as the 
circumstance in which “research findings are compared against the gold standard of true 
relationships in a scientific field”). 
 425. See Eli Lilly, 435 F. App’x at 924–25. 
 426. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 427. Cf. The T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (“[W]hen some 
have thought a device necessary, at least we may say that they were right, and the others too 
slack. . . . [But this] does not bear on [liability] at all.”). 
 428. Eli Lilly, 435 F. App’x at 924. 
 429. Ioannidis et al., Replication Validity, supra note 9, at 306; Kane, supra note 248, at 838. 
 430. Baker, supra note 86, at 274. 
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even social sciences.431 Because enablement is assessed for each 
patent—independent of its field of art—patents in less “intractable” 
fields may still suffer from irreproducible results. Those patents should 
be no less subject to postapplication evidence. 
Demanding a full-scope analysis would therefore have the 
beneficial effect of invalidating broad patents that cover irreproducible 
embodiments—a sensible interpretation of the patent statute’s 
requirement that patents must inform their users to “make and use” 
the invention.432 It would also strongly discourage patentees from filing 
overbroad claims in the first instance, and patentees would either rely 
on stronger data to prove their possession of the invention or narrow 
their claims to comport with the data they have. Irreproducible 
patents—such as those broadly claiming “a method of treating cancer” 
where preclinical trials suggest only a narrower indication—would 
consequently run afoul of this proscription.433 
To be sure, embracing the full-scope doctrine has disadvantages. 
It cuts against the principle that patent claims can—and sometimes 
should—encompass after-arising technologies.434 Inventors, for 
example, may be able to fully possess and describe their claims—even 
if they are unaware of precise applications of their technologies.435 And 
a full-scope doctrine suffers from the fact that, at some level, “[t]here 
is always an unforeseen embodiment that falls within a claim.”436 
Bernard Chao has linked this principle to essential fairness: “[A] claim 
should not be invalidated simply because the inventor did not foresee 
every embodiment that may eventually fall within its scope.”437  
 
 431. Stodden, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
 432. See supra note 423.  
 433. See Holbrook, supra note 129, at 157–58. Holbrook notes: 
Enablement doctrine performs this role of confining the scope of the claims to what 
the inventor actually possessed. . . . This limit on the scope is particularly important in 
unpredictable art fields. For example, if a patentee discovers a cure for ovarian cancer, 
she likely will not be able to claim curing all forms of cancer. She can only claim that 
which the PHOSITA objectively recognized would be in the inventor’s possession. 
Id. 
 434. See Chao, supra note 14, at 1378 (“[A] claim should not be invalidated simply because 
the inventor did not foresee every embodiment that may eventually fall within its scope.”); 
Collins, supra note 13, at 1084–85 (arguing that some instances of after-arising technology should 
be covered by earlier-drafted claims); Holbrook, supra note 129, at 158 (“To require disclosure 
of every variant would be extremely costly and burdensome to both the applicant and the PTO.”). 
 435. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 13, at 1107–08 (discussing this in the context of protein 
identification and synthesis); Feldman, supra note 13, at 20–21 (discussing interferons); Lemley, 
supra note 13, at 116–17 (discussing antibodies). 
 436. Chao, supra note 14, at 1378. 
 437. Id. 
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But it is one thing to allow claims to encompass unforeseen 
developments in technology and another to allow them to cover 
technologies that failed to work when they were drafted. Supporting 
the former simply further encourages the drafting of overbroad claims, 
one of the central problems in patents today.438 Further, these criticisms 
of the full-scope doctrine seem to be outweighed by the heft of 
enablement’s purpose: that inventors should only be allowed to patent 
that which they can teach others to make and do.439 Aligning the full-
scope doctrine with enablement would do much to ensure that patent 
claims are actually enabled rather than being irreproducible. The 
solution is to simply require patentees to draft their claims more 
narrowly where the possibility of future disenabling evidence is low. 
CONCLUSION 
Although scientific and technological progress ultimately depend 
on reproducibility, patent law—and the doctrine of enablement, in 
particular—does little to promote it. Enablement’s ambiguities 
concerning the role of postapplication evidence, the scope of the 
enablement inquiry, and the doctrine’s relationship with utility all 
remain unresolved and favor patents grounded in early, irreproducible 
data. Pharmaceutical patents seem especially susceptible to these 
incentives encouraging irreproducibility—with truly problematic 
results. The widespread existence of such patents informs us a great 
deal about the true role of enablement in patent law. It strongly 
suggests that reproducibility analyses should factor into enablement 
determinations: patents that disclose irreproducible inventions simply 
fail to enable others to “make and use” the claimed inventions. It also 
demonstrates the limits of patents as vehicles of scientific disclosure. 
And it resolves the current doctrinal tension between utility and 
enablement. These lessons concerning reproducibility in patent law 
should better align scientific practice with innovation policy and 
prevent the current incentive structure of disenablement. 
 
 438. See Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1339–41 (2011) (describing the problem of overbreadth in identifying the 
“abstract idea” of a patent’s claims). See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197 (2016) (discussing the idea of scope across intellectual property 
disciplines). 
 439. See Seymore, supra note 29, at 652 (“[T]he teaching function and enablement are 
inextricably related . . . .”). 
